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THE STORIES OF MARRIAGE 
 




The gay and lesbian community’s response to California’s Proposition 8 was 
strong and quick.1 Within days of the 2008 election, opponents of the measure had 
targeted its proponents, in particular the Mormon Church, as subjects for scorn.2 
Singling out the Mormon Church on this issue was particularly ironic because to 
the extent that members of the Mormon Church were responsible for the success of 
Proposition 8, they simply did to the gay community what courts of the United 
States consistently did to their forebears: defined away their right to marry.3 In 
striking down individuals’ rights to enter into polygamous marriages, courts said 
that polygamy was not marriage and that monogamy was marriage, but they 
expended little energy explaining why.4 This article does not condone either the 
forceful effort to pass Proposition 8 or the counter-response from the gay 
community,5 but it will argue that part of the problem that same-sex marriage 
                                                 
∗ © 2010 Katharine K. Baker, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This 
paper has benefited from conversations with many people, but I would like to extend 
special thanks to Felice Batlan, Mary Anne Case, Steve Heyman, Bob Pollack, participants 
in the Work, Family and Public Policy Workshop at Washington University, the Ian Ayers’ 
Co-Author Birthday Bash Workshop at Yale Law School and the Chicago-Kent/University 
of Illinois Law Faculty Symposium. 
1 Proposition 8, which the California electorate approved with a 52.3% margin on 
November 4, 2008, defined marriage as between a man and a woman, thus attempting to 
overturn the ruling of the California Supreme Court which granted gays and lesbians the 
right to marry. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452-53 (Cal. 2008); Secretary of 
State Debra Bowen, California General Election, Proposition 8 – Eliminates the Right of 
Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 52.3% to 47.7%, Nov. 4, 2008, http://vote.sos.ca.gov/. 
2 Nicholas Riccardi, Mormon Church Feels the Heat Over Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/17/nation/na-mormons17. 
3 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (polygamy is an “offence 
[sic] against society”); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(“Monogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon 
which our culture is built.”). It should be noted that members of the Mormon Church no 
longer practice polygamy, and the Church has condemned its practice since 1890. 
4 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145. In Reynolds, the Court did suggest that polygamy “leads 
to patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in 
stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with 
monogamy.” Id. at 166. The Court didn’t expand on this theory and many might question 
whether it is really the number of spouses in a society’s understanding of marriage that 
marks the difference between despotism and other forms of government. 
5 To the extent that the gay and lesbian community has argued that the Proposition 8 
campaign was really nothing other than homophobia and hate, there is also a parallel to the 
campaign against polygamy. As Professor Sarah Gordon has explored, anti-Mormonism 
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(“SSM”) advocates encounter stems from the failure of courts to explain what 
marriage is. It is very hard to talk about a right to marry without a common 
understanding of why states license marriage. 
In the end, this article will offer a definition of marriage which suggests that 
marriage can be beneficial to the state, beneficial to the couple, and integrated into 
the rich social history of marriage without necessarily being gendered. In order to 
understand why this proffered story is important, the article first evaluates the 
marriage narratives that have been told to date in the SSM debate and shows how 
those stories have fared as constitutional claims. 
During the course of the last fifteen years, proponents of SSM have proffered 
several different constitutional arguments in favor of their cause. Most of these 
arguments have been rooted in either fundamental rights or equality theory. Both 
of these theories have prevailed in some places. The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
originally ruled that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was gender 
discrimination, in violation of the State’s Equal Rights Amendment.6 The Supreme 
Courts of Vermont and New Jersey found that gays and lesbians had a right, 
grounded in equality doctrine, to the same legal treatment as married people, 
though they did not have a right to have their relationship termed “marriage.”7 
New Jersey explicitly found that gays and lesbians did not have a fundamental 
right to marry.8 The Vermont court did not address that question. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the fundamental 
rights and equality arguments were inextricably intertwined and that gays and 
lesbians were entitled to get married, but not because they had a fundamental or 
equal right to do so.9 Instead, the Massachusetts court found that there was no 
rational basis for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.10 Recently, the 
California, Connecticut and Iowa Supreme Courts have found that gays and 
lesbians have an equality right to marry because restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.11 California also found 
                                                 
preceded the anti-polygamist movement. Polygamy became the target, but the original fear 
was of moral diversity and difference. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our National 
Hearthstone”: Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral 
Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 297 (1996). 
6 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). 
7 See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 
196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006). 
8 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 211. 
9 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
10 Id. at 961. 
11 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 
957 A.2d 407, 262-63 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009). 
The holding in the California case was overturned by Proposition 8, see In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 452-53, and the California Supreme Court accepted Proposition 8’s 
ability to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122, 
93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Cal. 2009). After Strauss, gay men and lesbians in California have 
neither equality nor a fundamental right to marry, though they do have both an equality and 
a fundamental right to “public recognition [of their] relationship as a family.” Id. at 70-71.  
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that gays and lesbians had a fundamental right to marry each other.12 Connecticut 
and Iowa did not reach that argument. 
There has been a good deal of ink spilled over how best to conceptualize the 
legal claim to SSM. Because most unenumerated fundamental rights arguments are 
controversial, courts and commentators often prefer equality arguments. Moreover, 
to some, the fundamental rights argument seems tautological because it assumes a 
contested definition of marriage.13 Presumably, before one says that there is a 
fundamental right to marriage, one has to define what marriage is. Pro-SSM 
advocates would define marriage in a way that can include same-sex couples. Anti-
SSM marriage advocates would define marriage as between a man and a woman. 
Thus, saying that there is a fundamental right to marriage does not say anything 
unless there is a common definition of marriage. Equality arguments, it was 
thought, avoided that tautological conundrum. But, equality doctrine cannot always 
do all the work that proponents of SSM claim. At least equality doctrine cannot do 
this work on its own; it needs a story of marriage to go with it. Ultimately, every 
argument requires a story about why marriage is important, with a definition of 
what marriage is. 
This article will explore six different stories of marriage. These are not the 
only stories told about marriage, nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, one can 
believe many of these stories simultaneously. But, different narratives tend to 
emerge as dominant in different arguments. Part II examines the stories of 
marriage told by advocates of SSM and explains how those stories fare under both 
fundamental rights and equal protection analyses. Part III explains the stories told 
by critics of SSM. These stories suggest that contrary to what the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples almost certainly passes rational basis 
review; and, despite the racial analogies used by the courts in California, 
Connecticut and Iowa, racial equality doctrine may not be the most appropriate 
precedent.  
The critical problem with the equality argument for SSM is that marriage, as 
it currently operates in our culture, is deeply gendered. It is gendered not only in 
the sense that, in most states, opposite-sex couples have the exclusive right to enter 
into marriage, it is gendered because of the way in which marriage facilitates, 
produces, and legitimates gender roles. If the predominant story of marriage is one 
of an institution that exists to foster differentiated gender role development, then 
the equality theory rings hollow because same-sex couples and opposite-sex 
couples are not similarly situated in their ability to reify gender roles in marriage. 
                                                 
12 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 448. 
13 See Andrew Koppelman, Grading the California Same-Sex Marriage Opinion, 
BALKINIZATION (2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/grading-california-same-sex-
marriage.html (“It won’t do to just define marriage as ‘the substantive right of two adults 
who share a loving relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family 
of their own.’ That’s just a bald conclusion masquerading as an argument.”). 
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Many people will scoff at this understanding of marriage as a purposefully 
gendered institution. How can that be a legitimate definition in an era of gender 
equality? Perhaps it is not a legitimate definition of marriage, but it is an accurate 
description of contemporary marriage. Empirical data verifies what critics of SSM 
celebrate: marriage is a “gender factory.”14 Part IV explores the social science data 
showing how marriage makes gender. 
At a doctrinal level, the fact that marriage is a gender factory may be 
constitutionally irrelevant. After all, those who believe that marriage is and should 
be gendered appear to believe in “the very stereotype the law condemns.”15 What 
makes the gendered story relevant to legal discussions of SSM is its accurate 
reflection of the current state of heterosexual marriage and its ability to explain 
why and how marriage may be so important to people. As the end of Part IV 
suggests, for many people, the ability to live into the stereotypes the law (at times) 
condemns is enormously important to their personal identity. The fulfillment of 
those socially prescribed gender roles could be so important to a person’s personal 
and intimate life that the right to enter an institution that reifies those roles triggers 
constitutional protection. In other words, the gendered story of marriage reveals an 
inherent tension between that which may make marriage a fundamental right and 
the gender equality doctrine that may mandate SSM. 
A further problem with the equality argument for SSM is that an examination 
of the law of gender equality, like an examination of the way marriage actually 
functions in people’s lives, reveals ambivalence about the legitimacy of gender 
roles.16 Part V shows how confused the law of sex equality is. Despite the 
constitutional doctrine suggesting that gender roles, particularly gender roles in the 
household, are constitutionally suspect,17 other areas of the law seem to 
                                                 
14 This term was coined by Sarah Fenstermaker Berk in SARAH FENSTERMAKER 
BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 
3-10 (Plenum Press 1985). 
15 The phrase originally comes from Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991), but is 
also cited in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) and used by Mary Anne Case to 
elaborate on how and when the constitution condemns gender stereotypes, see Mary Anne 
Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law 
as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2000). 
16 Not one court since Baehr has adopted the theory of sex discrimination, 
notwithstanding the extensive academic literature exploring how restrictions on SSM are 
sex discrimination. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 
1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 230-34 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation 
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 154, 160 (1988); 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 153-72 (The Free Press 
1996); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
LAW, 53-55 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 2002). For a more complete list of scholars who have 
argued that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination, see KOPPELMAN, 98 
Yale L.J. at 169, nn.4-6.  
17 See generally Case, supra note 15, at 1464 (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
strikes down any sex differentiation that relies on a gender stereotype unless the stereotype 
is a perfect proxy for sex difference); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some 
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accommodate gender roles. Indeed, in both the employment and the marital 
context, the more pronounced the gender roles and traits, the more the law feels 
compelled to accommodate them. And, even in the constitutional context, 
sometimes the law accommodates gender and sex differences. 
If enough people believe in or somehow know the gendered story of marriage 
to be true, equality arguments for SSM, whether rooted in gender or racial 
analogies, prove difficult. The gender equality doctrine may be willing to 
accommodate the gendered roles that gendered marriage celebrates, and the racial 
discrimination analogy may seem inapt in the face of an institution that gets its 
social and personal import from its ability to reify gender. That is why it is 
important for proponents of SSM to tell a non-gendered story of marriage. But, it 
has to be a story of marriage that explains how marriage can retain the symbolic 
and constitutive potential that gender roles have traditionally provided for it 
without gender being a part of the story. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, SSM 
advocates must tell a story of marriage that suggests there is a “there there” after 
one takes the gender out of marriage.18 
Part VI of this essay will offer one such story. It is an understanding of 
marriage as an institution in which dependencies develop, roles are assumed and, 
for a variety of reasons stemming from the emotional and sexual connections 
involved, the general rules of property and contract do not work well. A narrative 
like this degenders marriage, but it also celebrates the lack of autonomy, 
substantial interdependence and role assumption that mark many marriages. It is 
not a narrative that extols the values—individual expression, freedom from social 
constraint, personal liberty—that the Constitution is often prized for protecting. 
When forced to confront this alternative marriage narrative, many people may not 
feel like celebrating. In that case, we need to ask why we have state-sponsored 
marriage at all. If we are to have state-sponsored marriage that includes same-sex 
couples, we need a story of marriage that explains what marriage is after the 
gender is gone. 
 
I.  ONE SET OF STORIES 
 
To date, there have been three main stories told by SSM advocates about what 
marriage is and why gays and lesbians should be entitled to it. In the first story, 
marriage is a bundle of rights and obligations pertaining to how each member of 
the couple must treat each other and how outsiders must treat the couple. These 
rights and obligations usually include, inter alia, the right to receive a portion of a 
spouse’s estate if she dies intestate, the right to bring a wrongful death action, the 
right to access spousal health, disability and accident insurance plans, the right to 
                                                 
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 154 (1992) 
(noting how the Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant about striking down legal 
presumptions rooted in the breadwinner-homemaker stereotypes). 
18 GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY, Ch. 4 (1937) (describing 
Oakland, California as a place for which “there is no there there.”). 
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assert evidentiary privileges, the right to hospital visitation and other incidents 
relevant to medical treatment of a family member, and the entitlements and 
responsibilities pertaining to spousal maintenance and marital property at 
separation.19 
These rights and obligations can often result in significant financial savings 
and security for couples. The state provides these incidents of marriage to couples 
because these incidents afford couples the freedom to divide labor and develop 
interdependencies that promote stability and protect against dependency on the 
state. States value stability for a whole host of reasons20 and almost always prefer 
that dependents’ needs are met in private, thereby relieving any responsibility that 
might fall to the state. 
This narrative of marriage suggests that states create and sanction marriage 
because they benefit from it. It is a narrative that is particularly susceptible to 
equality arguments for SSM because opponents of SSM have difficulty explaining 
why gay and lesbian couples need to be denied the concrete benefits of marriage, 
or how the state could possibly be hurt by providing these stabilizing benefits to 
gay and lesbian couples.21 
The problem with this story of marriage is that while it often forces the state 
to provide all of the legal rights and obligations of marriage, it does not compel the 
state to provide the symbolic benefits of marriage. Thus, the Supreme Courts of 
Vermont and New Jersey found that gays and lesbians were entitled to Civil Union 
status, but not marital status.22 If the bundle of rights and obligations that 
accompanies marital status is what marriage is, then gays and lesbians are treated 
equally once they become entitled to that bundle of rights and obligations. The 
term “marriage” is a peripheral issue in the first narrative of marriage because the 
first narrative of marriage defines marriage as the legal rights and obligations that 
accompany it, not the symbolism in the term itself. 
The second story of marriage is the one that has been told most prominently 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and it focuses much less on the concrete benefits of 
marriage and much more on the symbolic benefits of marriage—most particularly, 
its emotional and expressive benefits. Although not precisely clear about why or 
when this right exists, the Court has ruled that states cannot deny the right to marry 
                                                 
19 For a more complete list of the legal rights and obligations of marriage, see Anita 
Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 149-52 (2003).  
20 A stable social system is likely to be better poised to accumulate wealth, less prone 
to violence, and better able to organize in times of peril than an unstable social system. 
21 The Supreme Courts of Vermont and New Jersey relied on this kind of equality 
reasoning in ruling that the respective states must provide Civil Union status to gay and 
lesbian couples. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,886-89; (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 
908 A.2d 196 213-17. (N.J. 2006).  
22 Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89; Lewis, 908 A.2d at 423. After Proposition 8 passed, the 
California Supreme Court reached essentially the same conclusion. See Strauss v. Horton, 
207 P.3d 48, at 70-71. (Cal. 2009). 
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to poor people23 or to prisoners.24 The Court has suggested that the right to enter 
into marriage is grounded in privacy doctrine because of the critical role that 
families play in our private lives,25 but it has also emphasized the public aspect of 
marriage. Thus, marriage can be both “the most important relation in life” and “the 
foundation of society.”26 It “affects personal rights of the deepest significance . . . 
[but] . . . [i]t also touches basic interests of society.”27 
In Turner v. Safley, the Court wrote that marriage is “an expression of 
emotional support and public commitment . . . [and] an expression of personal 
dedication.”28 Plaintiffs in New Jersey picked up on this expressive element of 
marriage: it is the “ultimate expression of love, commitment and honor that you 
can give another human being.”29 “[O]thers know immediately that you have taken 
steps to create something special.”30 This story of marriage corresponds with what 
Peggy Cooper Davis has described as the nineteenth century human rights 
ideology that supported the recently enslaved’s right to marry. She describes this 
ideology as grounded in the “conviction that . . . [there is a] . . . human capacity to 
make life-defining choices, and [a] human drive to do so, . . . such that every 
person has an inalienable entitlement to construct a life on chosen terms . . . .”31 
The decision to marry is a decision about who one wants to be. This understanding 
of marriage suggests that the decision to enter into marriage is a personal one 
because it involves critical issues of self-determination, but it is also a public one 
                                                 
23 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin law that 
denied marriage licenses to people who could not show that they would not be in arrears on 
their child support payments). 
24 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987) (striking down prison regulation that 
prevented male prisoners from marrying). 
25 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. In explaining why the right to marry is fundamental, the 
Court cited almost every constitutional case having anything to do with parenting, 
procreation, marriage or other family relationships. Id. 
26 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
27 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). 
28 Turner, 482 U.S. at 95. 
29 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 225-26 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting plaintiffs’ briefs). 
30 Id. 
31 Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, Reconstructing Law and Marriage, 11 THE 
GOOD SOCIETY 57, 58 (2002), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v011 
/11.3davis.html. Given how strongly gendered most marital lives are, it may seem odd to 
think of the decision to marry as a decision to construct life on terms of one’s choosing. If 
marriage gives one little opportunity to avoid gender roles, then choosing to marry hardly 
seems like a decision to construct one’s own terms, unless marriage offers a unique 
opportunity to live life in a particularly gendered way. I make use of story #6 to suggest 
this view. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text. 
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because marriage serves as a form of public expression.32 Expressing one’s 
commitment to another helps one become the self one wants to be. 
Not surprisingly, this story of marriage as expression and self-determination 
fits quite squarely into fundamental rights analysis.33 It is a right to express who 
one is by making a public commitment to another. The right to make this 
simultaneously personal and public declaration is very important to human 
development and happiness, and therefore, the state must be very careful not to 
interfere with it. It is worth noting though, how distinct this theory of entitlement is 
from the first one. The first story sees marriage as a legal construct, a state-created 
bundle of rights and obligations. The second story sees marriage as an institution—
like religion, perhaps—that serves human interests and values and with which the 
state should not interfere.34 
The problem with this second story of marriage is that what gives marriage its 
expressive potential and symbolic meaning is its social and historical context. 
Getting married makes a statement because of what people understand marriage to 
mean. Marriage has been a part of our social and political structure for a very long 
time. Marriage and the family that it instantly creates is still an organizing 
principle for many people’s lives. But marriage to someone of the same sex might 
not be. What “others know immediately”35 about the statement one makes when 
one gets married depends on what others understand marriage to mean. I do not 
have, and no one would realistically maintain that I have, a fundamental right to 
marry my dog. It would be ludicrous for me to maintain such a right because no 
                                                 
32 Cass Sunstein has suggested that the right to marry counts as fundamental “because 
of the expressive benefits that come from official state-licensed marriage.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2005). 
33 In Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the Court declared that marriage was 
“one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival,” 
(citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 
(1888)). Loving involved an anti-miscegenation statute, which the court struck down as 
unconstitutional, but it did so without giving any explanation as to why marriage was a 
fundamental right.  The cases it cited, Skinner and Maynard, involved, respectively, a law 
requiring the sterilization of certain criminals and an action for divorce. Thus the Court 
declared that marriage was a fundamental right in Loving, but it made no attempt, as it did 
in Zablocki and Turner, to explain why. 
34 The relationship between state-sponsored marriage and religion is a long and still 
extant one. In the Anglo-American tradition, secular authorities began to wrest control over 
marriage from ecclesiastical authorities starting somewhere around the 16th century, but 
the state was never too eager to unmoor marriage from its ecclesiastical roots. Hence, the 
basic understanding of what marriage was (a lifelong union of a man and a woman, for 
which consent was necessary and one of the primary purposes of which was the rearing of 
children) did not change significantly when the state began to assert control. Indeed, even 
today, the degree to which the state cedes control over marriage to religious authorities is 
striking given the Constitutional commandment to separate church and state. See 
KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW 6-7, 11-12 (Aspen 
Publishers 2009). 
35 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d at 196 (N.J. 2006). 
2010] THE STORIES OF MARRIAGE 9 
 
one would know what it means (sharing a home with my dog? Sharing material 
goods? A sexual relationship?). Because the expressive value of marriage is 
dependent on marriage’s social meaning and because that social meaning is 
contested, the right to marry depends, as critics of the theory have maintained, on a 
common definition of marriage.36  
A third story of marriage was told by the California Supreme Court in the In 
re Marriage Cases.37 This story understands marriage to be a state-conferred title, 
a blessing of sorts, pursuant to which a couple secures status from the state. With 
this state-conferred status comes the respect and dignity of others. In this version 
of marriage, the state-conferred benefits of marriage are inextricably intertwined 
with the emotional benefits of marriage because one helps determine the other. The 
personal well-being that comes from marriage comes in part from the respect and 
dignity that is afforded marital status. The California Court wrote that the “core 
substantive rights [of marriage] include . . . the opportunity of an individual to 
establish . . . an officially recognized and protected family . . . [that is] . . . entitled 
to the same respect and dignity as marriage.”38 The California Court found this 
narrative of marriage to be susceptible to both fundamental rights and equality 
arguments, but the court’s reasoning is a little odd. 
In California, when the Court decided In re Marriage Cases, the legislature 
had already provided gays and lesbians with the full panoply of rights and 
obligations that marriage brings (story #1). Domestic Partnership (as it was called 
in California) was not enough, the court said, because Domestic Partnership did 
not command the same respect and dignity as marriage. For people who believe 
that SSM will be disruptive to some of the most important social relations in 
society, this must just sound strange. As a fundamental rights argument, the court’s 
story of marriage proves too much. 
The California court found that it is not just respect and equal treatment from 
the state that matters for the right to marry, it is respect and dignity from the 
public.39 But what if someone has no respect for the institution of SSM and does 
not want to dignify it with her blessing? As a private citizen, surely she has the 
right to think whatever she wants about SSM. The California Supreme Court may 
think that a state license means that a married gay couple will be respected in the 
same way as a straight couple, but given the sizable number of people who oppose 
SSM, it is not at all clear why the court thinks that respect and dignity from others 
will automatically follow. Indeed, given the success of Proposition 8, one might be 
able to say that the California Supreme Court was simply wrong. The respect and 
                                                 
36 See Koppelman, supra note 13 (“The fact that you really, really, want to get 
married can’t be the basis for a constitutional right. Otherwise, the incest and polygamy 
laws would be in trouble too.”). 
37 In re Marriage Cases, 193 P.2d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
38 Id. at 399. 
39 Id. at 444 (“[O]ne of the core elements embodied in the state constitutional right to 
marry is the right of an individual and a couple to have their own official family 
relationship accorded respect and dignity.” A couple is “constitutionally entitled” to 
“respect and dignity.”). 
10 JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES [VOL. 12 
  
dignity of others does not follow the state’s conferral of marriage, yet it was the 
respect and dignity from others that the Court said was a key part of the 
fundamental right to marry.40 
The California Court’s marriage narrative seems much less odd in the context 
of equality theory. The state cannot grant domestic partnerships for gay people and 
marriage for straight people even if they are identical legal statuses because, as 
virtually everyone who has ever had a Civics class in this country knows, separate 
is not equal. The cite here is to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,41 in which 
the Supreme Court famously held that African-American children had an equal 
right to the same education as white children. The Supreme Court did not hold that 
African-American children had a fundamental right to a decent education.42 Brown 
was only an equality case. The maintenance of white and non-white regimes, wrote 
the Court, “generates a feeling of inferiority . . . and may affect [African-American 
children’s] hearts and minds,” because “the policy of separating the races is 
usually interpreted as demonstrating the inferiority of the negro group.”43 
According to the California Supreme Court, the maintenance of two marital 
regimes runs a comparable risk of creating “second class citizenship”44 for 
Domestic Partnerships. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner, augmented 
this equality analysis somewhat by pointing out that “private biases may be outside 
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”45 
Just because some people may not afford SSM respect and dignity does not mean 
that the law can formally acknowledge that lack of respect. The cite here was to 
Palmore v. Sidoti,46 a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts could 
                                                 
40 To the extent that the Court was trying to say members of the public should give 
same-sex couples respect and dignity, it was expressing an aspiration, not explaining the 
content of a fundamental right. To the extent that it was saying that the state must 
encourage members of the public to afford same-sex couples respect and dignity because 
the state encourages members of the public to do the same for married couples, then it is 
making an equality argument. See infra notes 41-46. 
41 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 494 (quoting district court in Kansas). 
44 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
45 Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 479 (Conn. 2008) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984)). The Connecticut Legislature, like the California Legislature, 
had already instituted full Civil Union status when Kerrigan was decided. Id.  The Court in 
Kerrigan suggested that it was using sex equality doctrine, not race equality doctrine to 
reach its result, see Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996)), but its dismissal of Civil Unions as inherently unequal relies on and reads 
much more like Brown v. Board of Education than United States v. Virginia. See Kerrigan, 
957 A.2d at 418-419 (citing Brown and In Re Marriage Cases, but no sex discrimination 
cases for the proposition that separate is not equal). For a discussion of the critical 
differences between Brown and United States v. Virginia, see infra notes 205-225 and text 
accompanying.  
46 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). 
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not take into account the fact that a white child raised in a mixed race household 
might suffer hardship in a way that she would not if she was raised in an all white 
household because to do so would legitimize racist biases. Together, say the courts 
of California and Connecticut, Brown and Palmore demonstrate how parallel 
marital regimes for same-sex couples violate basic principles of equality because 
of the way those different regimes will be valued socially, and therefore, gays and 
lesbians must be entitled to marriage itself. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa took a different path to gay marriage. Unlike 
California and Connecticut, Iowa did not provide either Civil Unions or Domestic 
Partnership benefits for gay and lesbian couples so the Iowa court was not deciding 
whether separate could be equal.47 It was deciding whether a “mini-DOMA,”48 
passed by the Iowa legislature in 1998, could define marriage as between a man 
and a woman. The Iowa Court adopted a story of marriage much like story #1. 
Relying on an earlier loss of consortium case, the court defined marriage as 
“rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the 
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized 
society.”49 But, it also found that gays and lesbian were a suspect class and any 
classification that singled them out for different treatment deserved heightened 
scrutiny.50 
The mini-DOMA probably made the Iowa court’s discrimination analysis 
easier. Prior to 1993, when Baehr was decided in Hawaii, few states had even 
bothered to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. The opposite-sex definition 
was assumed. Legislative enactments that did so after Baehr were clearly designed 
to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. As the Iowa Supreme Court wrote, 
“[b]y purposefully placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay and 
lesbian individuals, the ban on same-sex civil marriages differentiates implicitly on 
the basis of sexual orientation.”51 This kind of “animus toward the class that it 
affects”52 is much more transparent in the mini-DOMAs of the 1990s than in the 
myriad of marriage statutes that pre-dated them. 
By focusing on the 1998 statute, not the historical and almost universal 
understanding of marriage as between a man and a woman, it was easier for the 
Iowa court to say that an opposite-sex requirement was discrimination against gays 
and lesbians. The court never reached the question of whether a comparable status, 
like civil unions or domestic partnerships, that provide “an institutional basis for 
                                                 
47 Varnum v. O’Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
48 Mini-DOMA is the phrase used to refer to the multiple state statutes passed in the 
wake of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 44, 44 (Haw. 1993), and in the wake of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), which defined marriage as between a man 
and a woman. 
49 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at, 883 (citing Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 
1983)). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 885. 
52 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). 
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defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in 
organized society,” could be equal.53 
Thus, the equality arguments for SSM have relied mostly on racial equality 
doctrine and have focused on gays and lesbians as a class, not on the question of 
what marriage is. California, Connecticut and Iowa all found that gays and lesbians 
were a suspect class. California and Connecticut then went on to rule that the 
alternative marriage regimes for gays and lesbians violated the racial equality 
principle that separate is not equal. Iowa found that the state statute defining 
marriage as between a man and a woman was designed to discriminate against 
gays and lesbians.54 Initially, then, it seems that equality arguments more easily 
avoid the problem of defining marriage. But as the rest of the article will suggest, 
the strength of equality arguments depends on a genderless conception of marriage. 
 
II.  THE OTHER SET OF STORIES 
 
Critics of SSM have their own stories of marriage. The first of these stories 
has to do with marriage as a procreative institution. This story of marriage has 
probably received the most attention,55 but it is also, I will suggest, the weakest. 
The second story has to do with marriage as an institution for child-rearing. The 
third story has to do with marriage as an institution for gender reification. The 
second and third of these stories have considerable significance for SSM 
arguments. For consistency sake, I will refer to the critics’ narratives as Stories 4, 5 
and 6 and the proponents’ narratives as Stories 1, 2, and 3. 
Story #4 suggests that marriage is an institution designed for procreation. For 
years, the only legal way to engage in the conduct that led to procreation was to do 
so within the institution of marriage. Recently, a group of Catholic theologians, 
known to some as the New Natural Law Theorists,56 have gone so far as to suggest 
that marriage can be restricted to opposite-sex couples because married 
heterosexual sex is an inherent good in a way that no other form of sexual 
expression is.57 Others have done much to refute this latter point about the inherent 
superiority of married heterosexual sex.58 It is, as the authors of the view concede, 
                                                 
53 Id. at 883. 
54 Massachusetts, which had neither an alternative marriage regime nor a mini-
DOMA to evaluate, did not apply any heighted scrutiny and simply found that restricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples was irrational. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
55 See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 901-02. 
56 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 16, at 79. 
57 See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 
84 GEO. L.J. 301, passim (1995); see also John M. Finis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual 
Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, passim (1994). 
58 See Mary Becker, Women Morality and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 165, 185 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. 
J. JURIS. 51, 57-62 (1997). 
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a viewpoint that one either implicitly understands or one does not.59 As one who 
does not, it makes little sense for me to comment on it here. 
Regardless of one’s view on the superiority of married heterosexual 
intercourse, any student of literature or history is well aware that marriage has 
never been particularly good at policing sexuality. One of the purposes of marriage 
may have been to channel sexuality into marital relationships, but sex has 
happened outside of marriage throughout history.60 If marriage’s primary purpose 
had been to restrict sexual activity to marriage, marriage would have broken down 
as an institution. It simply is not up to the defined task. Policing extra-marital 
sexual activity is and always has been extraordinarily difficult. The activity takes 
place in private. There are no non-culpable witnesses, and unless the participants 
are willing to implicate themselves, the activity is virtually impossible to prove. 
Until very recently, the only way to know whether sex happened was if a 
pregnancy resulted, but as long as the woman who got pregnant was married to 
someone, there was no way of proving that the sex was extra-marital.61 
What marriage has been much better at is providing an institution for child-
rearing. Marriage is not about making babies (Story #4), but about taking care of 
them. This is the fifth story of marriage—marriage as an institution designed to 
ensure optimal child-rearing. A child born to a marriage (regardless of the actual 
origins of his or her genetic material) has a mother and a father whose 
responsibility it is to provide materially, emotionally, physically and spiritually. 
William Blackstone understood and endorsed this view. He wrote “[t]he main end 
and design of marriage . . . [is] to ascertain and fix upon some certain person to 
whom the care, the protection, the maintenance and the education of the children 
should belong . . . .”62 The marital presumption of paternity, which until quite 
recently was practically irrebuttable,63 is the strongest indicator of the law’s 
allegiance to the story of marriage as an institution for child-rearing. 
                                                 
59 George & Bradley, supra note 57, at 307 (“In the end, we think, one either 
understands that spousal genital intercourse has a special significance as instantiating a 
basic, noninstrumental value, or something blocks that understanding and one does not 
perceive correctly.”). 
60 See generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 
1500-1800 (1977) (documenting extra marital sexual activity); Harold T. Christensen & 
Christina F. Gregg, Changing Sex Norms in America and Scandinavia, 32 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 616, 616-27 (1970) (summarizing studies of premarital sex); 2 Samuel 11:1-5 
(Bathsheba and King David). 
61 Genetic testing now allows us to test whether there has been an exchange of bodily 
fluids and to identify the source of those fluids. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 19-1.4 (1997). 
62 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443, *455. 
63 See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology: The History and Future 
of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22-25 (2004) 
(explaining how, without genetic testing, proving paternity was so difficult that litigants 
could not overcome the marital presumption). 
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The problem with this narrative of marriage, for opponents of SSM, is that 
gays and lesbians can rear children within marriage too. Indeed, the reason that 
many gays and lesbians want to get married is because they want to raise children. 
To foreclose that option, opponents of SSM have to add an addendum to Story #5 
indicating that the best way to rear children is to provide them with both of their 
biological parents. Thus, the full version of Story #5 is that marriage is for child-
rearing and because child-rearing is done best by biological parents, marriage is for 
two people who, together, can be biological parents.64 
The addendum about biological parents may or may not be true. Reliable 
evaluations about what matters most for optimal child-rearing are very difficult to 
produce. The studies that scholars do have access to are varied, rarely longitudinal, 
and wildly disparate in result.65 There are no reliable studies suggesting that bi-
gendered role modeling really matters; nor are there studies proving that it does not 
matter, and many people think that a parent of each gender is good for children.66 
To be reliable, studies of child welfare must have a sufficient number of 
subjects and sufficient heterogeneity, yet control for class, culture and a host of 
other differences.67 After reviewing the existing studies of gay parenting, the Iowa 
Supreme Court expressed doubt that children need a mother and a father, but the 
court did not mention the substantial body of evidence suggesting that children 
raised by their biological parents perform better on a host of measures.68 Probably 
most significantly, for the SSM issue, recent studies strongly indicate that children 
growing up in blended families have more trouble than children growing up in 
biological nuclear families.69 Among most demographers and social scientists who 
study family structure and child well-being, it is now common wisdom that, on 
                                                 
64 The one exception to this is adoption, which opponents concede deprives children 
of their biological parents and provides non-biological parents with children, but adoptions 
are approved only when in the best interest of the child. See Monte Neil Stewart, 
Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 15-18 (2006). 
65 See William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and 
America’s Children, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 100-06 (2005) (explaining the 
problems with existing studies of children of same-sex couples). 
66 See Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: 
UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 63, 67 (Daniel Cere & 
Douglas Farrow eds., 2004) [hereinafter “DIVORCING MARRIAGE”] (“Those who believe 
that children need and have a right to both a mother and a father, preferably their own 
biological parents, oppose same-sex marriage because . . . it would mean that marriage 
could not continue to institutionalize and symbolize the inherently procreative capacity 
between the partners . . . .”). 
67 See Meezan & Rauch, supra note 65. 
68 See generally Amy Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 403-05 (2007) (citing studies). 
69 Id. 
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average, children raised by their own married, biological parents have an easier 
time than children raised in other circumstances.70 
Nonetheless, the majority of children in this country are raised in other 
circumstances.71 The environments in which children are raised are simply too 
varied for legislators or other policy makers to make reliable categorical rules 
about optimal child-raising.72 That is probably why we allow adoption even though 
there is strong evidence that adoption is often taxing on children.73 It is why many 
states allow single parents to adopt even though most people agree that two parents 
are better than one.74 It may be why we countenance step-families even though 
many children seem to fare worse in step-families than in single-parent families.75 
Most of the studies of gay families with children suggest that the children are 
not harmed by the same gender of their parents.76 Perhaps, for reasons we have yet 
to identify, a child raised by a biological mother and her non-biologically related 
                                                 
70 Lisa Gennetian, One or Two Parent? Half or Step Siblings? The Effect of Family 
Structure on Young Children’s Achievement, 18 J. POPULATION ECON. 415, 415-36 (2005) 
(for educational outcomes, children reared in traditional nuclear families do much better 
than those reared in other family structures); Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family 
Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and 
Descriptive Regressions, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 671, 676 (2004); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY 
SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 1 (1994) 
(children raised by both biological parents do substantially better along several metrics than 
children raised by single parent or biological parent and step-parent). 
71 See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 70, at 2-3 (“Well over half of the 
children born in 1992 will spend all or some of their childhood apart from one of their 
parents.”). 
72 Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American Family and Family 
Economics, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 19 (2007) (“Because family structure is 
intertwined with other parental characteristics that affect children, a causal relationship 
between family structure and child outcomes is difficult to establish.”). 
73 See generally DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG 
SEARCH FOR SELF 7-10 (Anchor Books 1992). 
74 JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN 
FAMILY LAw 118 (Columbia Univ. Press 2000) (Describing as “irrefutable” the evidence 
that, “all else being equal, two parents are better than one,” but noting considerable 
disagreement about what makes “all else equal.”). 
75 See Wax, supra note 68, at 403; Gennetian, supra note 70, at 431 for outcomes of 
step-families. 
76 Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblorze, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of 
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 162-64 (2001) (most current research indicates 
that there is no difference in development between children that live with heterosexual 
parents and children who live with same-sex parents); Katrien Vanfraussen et al., Family 
Functioning in Donor Families Created by Donor Insemination 73 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 78, 78-90 (2003) (no differences in how parents and children in gay 
and straight families perceived the quality of their relationships); Raymond Chan et al., 
Psychosocial Adjustment Among Children Conceived via Donor Insemination by Lesbian 
and Heterosexual Mothers, 69 CHILD. DEVELOPMENT 443, 443-57 (sexual orientation of 
parents had no significant impact on psychological well-being of their children.). 
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husband struggles more than a child raised by a biological mother and her female 
partner or a biological father and his male partner.77 Perhaps children that would be 
raised in a household with two gay parents if a state allows SSM will otherwise be 
raised in a household with only one parent if the state prohibits SSM. Perhaps 
having only one parent would be worse. But we do not know. Our predictive 
power when it comes to optimizing child outcomes given the situations children 
find themselves in is woefully deficient. 
One fact is certain. Children in gay households are not going to be raised in 
the one family structure that social science has so far identified as being the most 
likely to be good for children. That fact is hardly dispositive, however. Most 
children in this country are probably not raised in that optimal family structure. 
And, there may be other family structures that are comparably good for children, 
but we have yet to identify them. 
The Supreme Courts of Vermont, Massachusetts and New Jersey made much 
of the fact that their state legislatures had already enacted various protections for 
gay adoption, and that therefore it made no sense for the legislatures to preference 
straight over gay parenting.78 But, adoptive parents are always treated differently 
than other parents. A single person is allowed to adopt and parent a child on his or 
her own, even though we do not give a single person the exclusive right to parent a 
child born as a result of heterosexual intercourse.79 Allowing gay men and women 
to enter into second-parent adoptions80 says that the legislature thinks a child is 
better off with two parents than with one. It does not necessarily mean that the 
legislature thinks there is no difference between two parents of the same sex and 
two parents of the opposite sex. 
Most important, all potential adopters have to be screened. No one is allowed 
to adopt domestically unless they have passed the licensing requirements for 
parenthood.81 Non-adoptive parents do not have to get licensed.82 They get parental 
                                                 
77 One potentially important factor might be when the non-biological parent joined the 
family unit. Children living in a “blended” family may do just as well as children living in 
traditional nuclear family if those children never knew any other family structure or any 
other parent. This kind of non-biological-parent-there-from-the-start arrangement is 
probably more common in gay and lesbian households. 
78 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864,881-82 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963-64 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 213. (N.J. 
2006). 
79 Both the child and the other genetic contributor have the right to establish parentage 
in the genetic father. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 602, ULA PARENTAGE § 602 (2002). 
80 “Second parent adoptions” refers to the practice of allowing a second same-sex 
parent to adopt a child who only has one legal parent. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY 
LAW 927, n.10 (3d ed. 2005). 
81 States investigate all potential adoptive parents before approving an adoption. See, 
e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, §2-203 (1994) (detailing the requirements for investigating a 
potential adopters home including determining “whether the individual is suited to be an 
adoptive parent.”). 
82 See Uniform Parentage Act, supra note 79, at § 201 (detailing when men and 
women are presumed to be fathers and mothers of a child). 
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status by virtue of genetics or marriage. In allowing gay adoptions, legislatures 
could be saying that gays and lesbians can be parents only if they are genetically 
related to the child or if they are licensed as a parent. That is very different than 
what marriage has traditionally done which is to assign parental status to a spouse, 
regardless of genetic connection or parenting skills. 
The ambiguity of the evidence regarding what matters in child-rearing 
explains why the constitutionality of the SSM issue is so important. Given the 
inconclusive data, a legislature that thinks that marriage is an institution designed 
primarily for the rearing of children may rationally reject gay marriage.83 
Legislators may not want to channel adults into families that will deprive children 
born into that family of any chance of being raised by their biological parents. 
Infertile couples or couples who do not want children may be allowed to marry 
because no children are born into those marriages.84 States cannot prove that more 
children will be worse off if we further sanction non-biological parenting, but 
neither can proponents of SSM prove that biological connection makes no 
difference. The burden of proof becomes critical. 
If marriage is a fundamental right, or if gays and lesbians have a 
constitutionally protected equality right to get married, the burden is on the state to 
prove that having both a mother and a father is critical.85 This the state cannot do. 
                                                 
83 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with this conclusion, 
finding that there was no rational reason to prevent gays and lesbians from marrying and 
therefore the strength of either a fundamental right or an equality argument was 
unimportant. The Court wrote that denying same-sex couples the right to marry would not 
in any way ensure that more children would be born into marital families because gays and 
lesbians would just have children outside of marriage, and then the children would not be 
able to enjoy the benefits of marriage. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963 (“The department has 
offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase the 
number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriage in order to have and raise 
children.”). The state may not have offered this evidence, but it hardly seems necessary. I 
know of no one who disputes a strong history of people who may have been inclined to 
enter into relationships with people of their own sex, but who nevertheless got married to 
people of the opposite sex and had children. One of the purposes of state sponsored 
marriage is to channel adults into certain kinds of relationships. See Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992). That is what 
family law does. Binary, monogamous lifelong relationships are hardly artifacts of nature. 
The law may not succeed in channeling everyone into what it sees as the ideal 
relationships, but it does not need to be 100% successful (or even narrowly tailored) in 
order to be considered rational. It would seem fully rational for a legislature to conclude 
that if there is no SSM, people who might enter into a SSM, will choose instead to enter 
into an opposite-sex marriage to raise children. 
84 If those couples “have” children, they adopt them and that is only done if in the best 
interest of the children.  See, e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 81 § 3-703 (“The 
Court shall grant a petition for adoption if it determines that the adoption will be in the best 
interest of the minor . . . .”).  
85 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899, n.26. (Iowa 2009). The Iowa Supreme 
Court reasoned that because gays and lesbians were a protected class, the opposite-sex 
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But if there is neither a fundamental right nor an equality right to marry, the burden 
is on SSM advocates to show that a policy favoring one parent of each gender is 
irrational. This, proponents of SSM probably cannot do. As a matter of policy, it 
might be extraordinarily wrong-headed to preclude two committed people of the 
same sex who very much want to parent with each other from doing so, but, given 
the evidence of what situations are better and worse for children, a reasonable 
legislator might conclude otherwise.86 
This leads us then to the sixth marriage narrative, marriage as a promoter and 
producer of gender roles. This story of marriage will probably be jarring to some. 
Perhaps because it can be so jarring, courts have not engaged it significantly, 
except to dismiss it categorically and without discussion.87 One finds this discourse 
of inherently gendered marriage mostly in the academic writings by opponents of 
SSM. The story goes something like this: 
 
Marriage is the primary institution through which gender is 
produced and realized. By acting as such, marriage serves as a critical 
source of identity for both men and women. Marriage creates a home 
environment marked by complementary, separate but equal gender roles. 
When men and women fulfill those roles they become more productive, 
responsible and happy citizens. 
 
This understanding of marriage is gleaned from many different descriptions of 
marriage. For instance, one scholar claims that marriage is “the central cultural site 
of male-female relations.”88 It is “an institution that interacts with a unique social-
sexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide.”89 Another author 
comments that marriage has “universal features” that include being “supported by 
                                                 
requirement for marriage was subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. Therefore, the burden was 
on the state to show that gay parenting was not as good for children as straight parenting. 
Id.   
86 Proponents of SSM often also point out that many opposite-sex couples get married 
without any intention of child-rearing. That fact does not render irrational legislative efforts 
to try to use marriage to ensure that children are raised by their biological parents. It just 
shows that marriage restrictions are underinclusive if the purpose is to use marriage to 
make sure that children are raised by their biological parents. But if stricter scrutiny is not 
triggered, than that underinclusiveness does not render SSM restrictions unconstitutional. 
87 Both the California and Massachusetts Supreme Courts simply stated that SSM 
would not fundamentally change the institution of marriage. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
965 n.28 (dismissing dissent’s claim that the majority was changing the institution of 
marriage itself because the dissent’s argument hewed too close to the idea that men and 
women are different); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d  384, 421 (Cal. 2008) (stating that 
SSM would not “change, modify or . . . deinstitutionalize the existing institution of 
marriage.”). 
88 Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 66, at 9, 14. 
89 Id. at 11 (citing the work of evolutionary psychologists Margo Wilson and Martin 
Daly). 
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authority and incentives” and the “interdependence of men and women.”90 
According to these commentators, bringing men and women together has been “the 
massive cultural effort of every human society at all times and in all places.”91 
Other scholars write that “[t]he status bestowed by marriage is that of ‘wife’ and 
‘husband’ and the relation between husband and wife is the form of life that 
marriage alone creates . . . .”92 
Marriage creates the “social identities” of husband and wife and those social 
identities (which are formed by social norms and expectations) are very different 
than the social identity of “partner.”93 “[B]oth spouses gain from . . . the benefits 
that come from faithfully fulfilling one’s chosen duties as . . . husband or wife.”94 
Marriage “sustains a complex form of social interdependency between men and 
women.”95 “Norms of trust, fidelity, sacrifice and providership . . . give [married] 
men clear directions about how they should act . . . [and] . . . [m]ost men seek to 
maintain their social status by abiding by society’s norms.”96 “Norms of adult 
maturity associated with marriage encourage adults to spend and save in a more 
responsible fashion . . . . [F]or many men, marriage is a right of passage that 
introduces them fully into an adult world of responsibility and self-control.”97 
With an extensive set of cultural norms and expectations about what it means 
to be married, i.e., to be a husband and wife, marriage channels men and women 
into gender roles that allow each to identify with and achieve the cultural ideals of 
masculine and feminine. If we allow people of the same sex to marry, we alter the 
essentially gendered nature of marriage and we put at risk the separate but equal 
masculine and feminine roles that marriage has traditionally reified. Having people 
live into and fulfill those roles has proven to be immensely beneficial for both 
                                                 
90 Katharine Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING 
MARRIAGE, supra note 66, at 41, 45. 
91 Id. at 43. 
92 F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, and 
the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619, 625 (2003). 
93 Stewart, supra note 64, at 19. 
94 THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 
[hereinafter “WITHERSPOON”] 12 (2006), available at http://www.princetonprinciples.org/ 
files/Marriage and the Public Good.pdf. 
95 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE 
MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 20 (New York: Institute for American Values 
2005). 
96 WITHERSPOON, supra note 94, at 21. 
97 Id. at 20. As these last few quotes indicate, much of the argument against SSM 
suggests that it is the benefits that married men receive individually and provide to the 
social whole that makes marriage so valuable. Married men measure significantly higher 
for psychological and physical health than do single men. Married women measure higher 
than single women, but not as much higher as men. See infra note 98. Non-married adult 
men are less happy, more violent, less responsible and less integrated into their 
communities. See STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 6-8 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 
1998). 
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society as a whole and individuals in particular.98 As Steven Nock writes, “It is in 
the intimacy of married life that men and women define themselves as persons 
rather than employees, students, voters, faithful believers or any number of other 
public identities. One of the most important dimensions of personal identity is 
gender.”99 
One response to this story may be that SSM will not destroy gendered 
marriage; it will just allow for an alternative. If heterosexual people still want to 
live gendered lives, SSM will not prevent them from doing so. The rejoinder to 
this argument is subtle, but not necessarily weak. By unmooring marriage from its 
gendering effects, SSM puts in jeopardy the way in which most married people 
have learned to express themselves as spouses, the way in which they have learned 
to live in a loving sexual relationship, and the way in which they have come to 
understand who they are as participating, responsible members of society. What 
allows marriage to do this is the rich set of norms, many of them gendered, which 
define how married people are to behave. The strong social pressure to conform to 
these norms restricts people’s freedoms but allows them to live into responsible 
masculinity and femininity.100 Adhering to the social norms of marriage and 
accepting the responsibilities of marital roles allows for a kind of self-expression 
and self-development that is both confining and ennobling.101 Those social norms 
                                                 
98 There is fairly consistent evidence that marriage makes both men and women 
happier, healthier and wealthier. Steven Nock writes “The many beneficial effects of 
marriage are well-known. Married people are generally healthier; they live longer, earn 
more, have better health and better sex lives, and are happier than their unmarried 
counterparts. . . . Some disagreement may exist about the magnitude of such effects, but 
they are almost certainly the result of marriage, rather than self-selection.” See NOCK, 
supra note 97, at 3 (citing numerous studies). For a more recent study, see Alois Stutzer & 
Bruno S. Frey, Does Marriage Make People Happy or do Happy People get Married?, 35 
J. SOCIO-ECON. 326, 327-34 (2006) (finding that marriage continues to be highly correlated 
with happiness for both men and women and that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . selection effects 
can explain the entire difference in well-being between singles and married people.”); see 
also Walter R. Gove et al., Does Marriage Have Positive Effects on the Psychological 
Well-Being of the Individual?, 24 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 122, 125 (1983) (marital 
status is the most powerful predictor of mental health for both men and women). 
99 NOCK, supra note 97, at 42. 
100 Bruce Hafen writes about the restrictions of family life this way, “the same 
relationships . . . that seem to tie us down are, paradoxically, the sources of strength most 
likely to lift us up.” Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The 
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 41 (1991). 
101 For more on how accepting the roles in marriage is both an expressive and 
constitutive act, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 
81 VA. L. REV 2045, 2088-89 (1995). Regan’s work builds on Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 959-1001 (1992) 
(articulating and analyzing the constitutive responsibility paradigm) and it is similar to how 
Katharine Bartlett has described parenthood. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing 
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 301 (1988) (citing the work of Nel Noddings, Caring: A 
Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 14 (Univ. of Cali. 1984), and 
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will change if, for instance, husband will not necessarily mean “provider” and wife 
will not necessarily mean “caretaker.”102 
Admittedly, some couples already alter aspects of these roles. But few couples 
abandon them completely.103 The more marriage’s gendered conventions are 
challenged, the less stable they become and the less likely they are to be re-
inforced by broad social consensus. Without that broad social understanding of 
marriage as gendered, the gendered norms that go with it will die and so will the 
roles through which many people have found meaning in their lives. 
For those who find this understanding of marriage somewhat alienating or just 
alien, it is important to recognize two distinct but important points. First, the 
gendered narrative fits very easily into much of the pre-existing constitutional 
discourse on marriage. One can see how marriage could be “the foundation of 
society,” “the most important relation in life,”104 and “fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race”105 because of the way in which it reifies gender, 
serving both the states interest in stability and protection against dependence 
(Story #1) and individuals’ interests in expression and self-determination (Story 
#2). What may make marriage so important to people is the sense of belonging and 
purpose that comes from accepting the restrictions and accolades that accompany 
marital gender roles. These restrictions and accolades have an enormous effect on 
one’s sense of self.106 They help one understand who one is. They are, as Stephen 
Nock suggested, a critical part of one’s identity.107 
                                                 
suggesting that accepting the responsibilities of parenthood is a means of adults striving to 
realize their “ennobled selves.”). 
102 The argument made by opponents of SSM here is akin to those highlighted by 
Jorge Aseff and Hector Chade, in an article addressing the problem of identity externalities. 
One’s ability to get value out of a given institution may depend on who else is part of that 
institution and thereby giving it an identity. See Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, An Optimal 
Auction with Identity-Dependent Externalities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 731, 731-32 (2008). 
103 One study famously found that though the percentage of unpaid work that a wife 
does in the home decreases as she earns more money relative to her husband, in those 
couples where the wife actually earns more than her husband, the wives begin to do a 
greater share of the housework. The authors attribute this phenomenon to the greater 
importance of conforming to gendered roles with regard to unpaid work if the couple is not 
conforming to those roles with regard to paid work. See Theodore N. Greenstein, Economic 
Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension, 
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 322, 333 (2000). 
104 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); see also Williams v. North 
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230. (1945). 
105 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539 (1942). 
106 Our sense of self comes, in part, from how others define us and most people use 
some sense of social norms to guide their judgment. Think, for instance, about how good it 
may feel to be called a “good husband” or a “good mother.” Or consider how bad it feels to 
be called a “bad husband” or “bad mother.” 
107 See NOCK, supra note 97, at 42 (“one of the most important dimensions of 
personal identity is gender”). 
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Thus, marriage’s ability to channel people into gender roles works at both a 
private and public level. The identity that comes from being married feels like the 
“intimate and personal” realm that is “central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”108 But, the norms that shape that identity are social. Part 
of what it means to be married is to accept roles defined by others. That is how we 
know what it means to “be a good wife” or “be a good husband”—because these 
terms have social meaning. And that social meaning is gendered. According to 
Story #6, the identity benefits from marriage stem from accepting assigned roles, 
not creating new ones. 
The second, and potentially more important, observation that flows from 
Story #6 is that a great deal of social science data confirms what this gendered 
story of marriage celebrates. The next Part explores more fully what the social 
science data indicates about the tendency of marriage to reinforce gender. 
 
III.  THE GENDER FACTORY 
 
As Story #1 suggested, one of the advantages of marriage is that it allows for 
a division of labor and an allocation of roles within households.109 This role 
division provides stability for the household, for the individuals within it and for 
society as a whole.110 In the vast majority of households, this role division is also 
gendered. As Sarah Berk showed in her classic book, The Gender Factory, 
standard economic explanations for how and why unpaid work might be divided in 
a household cannot explain the social reality of how work is divided in 
households.111 Gender can. Gender predicts who does what, how much each 
married partner does and why husbands and wives do not negotiate more over who 
does what or how much.112 Couples do not fight over what jobs they will do 
because the allocation is so patterned into who they are as gendered selves. And 
the more those gendered work patterns are replicated, the more entrenched gender 
roles become. Thus, the home and the marriages that define it not only reflect 
gender, they create it. “[G]ender both affects and is perhaps effected through the 
division of household labor. It is around household work that gender relations are 
produced and reproduced on a daily basis.”113 
                                                 
108 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992).  
109 See BERK, supra note 14, at 165 (“[W]ith respect to the apportionment of 
household tasks . . . men and women may share a work environment, but do not share 
much of its work.”).  
110 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
111 See BERK, supra note 14, at 162-65. 
112 Id. at 191 (“[H]ow people interact about who does what is as stable a phenomenon 
as the division of the work itself.”). 
113 Id. at 165. 
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Marriage increases the amount of domestic work that women do and 
decreases the amount that men do.114 Married women, regardless of whether they 
also work outside the home, do much more household work than their husbands.115 
Studies find that even in the most egalitarian households, women perform 59% of 
the domestic work.116 
Marriage, particularly marriages with children, decrease women’s 
commitment to paid work and increase their commitment to unpaid work. A strong 
majority of married mothers work outside the home,117 but in the most recent 
exhaustive study of time allocation in households with children, Suzanne Bianchi 
and her colleagues found that mothers average 67% of the unpaid work in a 
household, while fathers average 64% of the paid hours for a household.118 
Mothers do twice as much child care as fathers.119 
Mothers may be able to do more child care because they do less paid work 
than fathers. Married women often leave the labor force for a short or long period. 
Between 1983 and 1998, 50% of women, but only 16% of men, reported being out 
of the labor force for one full year.120 Thirty percent of women, but only 5% 
percent of men reported more than four years of zero earnings.121 Women with the 
strongest commitment to paid labor, i.e., those who reported earnings for every 
year of their prime earning years (ages 26-59), still reported working almost 500 
fewer hours per year than men.122 Some women may work less than the standard 
work week or standard work year; others may forego overtime opportunities when 
men do not. 
These differing work patterns are starkly reflected in the gender wage gap. 
Most wage gap measures usually only account for workers who work full time on 
an annual basis (thus excluding part-time or part-year workers, most of them 
                                                 
114 Beth Anne Shelton & Daphne John, Does Marital Status Make a Difference?: 
Housework Among Married and Cohabiting Men and Women, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 401, 417 
(1993) (women’s domestic labor goes up with marriage); Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of 
Transitions in Marital Status on Men’s Performance of Housework, 61 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 700, 700-01 (1999) (men’s domestic labor goes down with marriage). 
115 David Demo & Alan Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic 
Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. RES. 323, 323-31 (1993). 
116 Greenstein, supra note 103, at 333. 
117 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families 
in 2005, tbl.4 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/fame 
_04272006.pdf (Approximately 66% of married mothers worked outside the home in 2004-
2005). 
118 SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 91 
(Douglas L. Anderton et al. eds., 2006). 
119 Id. 
120 HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., HOW MUCH PROGRESS IN CLOSING THE LONG-TERM 
EARNINGS GAP? IN THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER? 125-31 (Francine D. Blau 
et al. eds., Russell Sage Foundation 2006). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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women). When one includes those part-time and part-year workers and looks at 
just prime earning years, women earn 38 cents for every dollar men earn.123 
Most women who currently make the choice to do less paid work were raised 
during what might be described as a time of maximum gender equality, with all the 
benefits that Title VII, Title IX, and constitutional gender equality doctrine 
afforded them.124 Yet almost half of all married mothers with children under the 
age of one leave the labor force.125 One study found that mothers born after 1965 
in households earning more than $120,000 a year, were more likely than not to be 
at home full-time.126 Another study found that “[e]ven wives with graduate and 
professional degrees do not usually work full time if their husband’s income 
exceed[s] $75,000.”127 
Marriage affords many women the opportunity to not work, or to work less. It 
does not appear to afford men the same choice. The labor supply curve for married 
women is very elastic, yet it is starkly inelastic for married men.128 If anything, 
marriage increases men’s commitment to the paid labor force because if their 
wives choose not to do paid work or do less of it, married men do more of it.129 
                                                 
123 Id. at 131. 
124 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1965) (Title VII refers to 
the prohibition on sex discrimination in employment); Educational Amendments of 1972, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1974) (Title IX refers to the prohibition on sex discrimination in 
education). Constitutional gender discrimination doctrine is discussed infra in Part IV. 
125 Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 52. The 
number of working married mothers with children under age one “fell from 59% in 1997 to 
53% in 2000” and stayed “roughly the same in 2002.” That drop was most pronounced 
among white well-educated women over thirty. Although six percentage points may not 
seem like a huge drop in the number of working women, economists suggest that it is 
significant. Id. 
126 Id. Women of the same income level, raised without the benefits of legally 
recognized gender equality, i.e., those born between 1946 and 1964 or baby-boomers, are 
significantly less likely to be home full-time (51% of post-baby-boomer mothers are home 
full-time versus 33% of baby-boomer mothers). 
127 Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates, 41 FAM. L.Q. 455, 
474 (2007). This finding is based on data from the 1997 Current Population Survey. Ellman 
also found that “as economic pressures decline, married American mothers increasingly 
choose to work part time rather than full time, regardless of their educational level.” Id. at 
475. 
128 EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 176-77 (1997). 
129 Men with non-wage-earning spouses work more than men whose wives earn 
wages, though they also earn considerably more per hour. One study found that men with 
non-working spouses work 4% more than men with working spouses, but that they earn 
20% more than their peers with working spouses. Tamar Lewin, Men Whose Wives Work 
Earn Less, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12 1994, at A1; see also Joy A. Schneer & 
Frieda Reitman, Effects of Alternate Family Structures on Managerial Career Paths, 36 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 830, 840 (1993) (what was once thought to be a marital bonus paid to 
married men is more accurately seen as a “traditional family bonus.” Men whose wives are 
home full-time earn more per hour than men whose wives work.). 
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Thus, marriage propels men into the paid labor force, even as it offers women a 
path out of it.130 
Neither men nor women seem particularly upset by this differential response 
to marriage. Despite their spending significantly different amounts of time on paid 
and unpaid work, married mothers and fathers report “feeling very successful in 
balancing work and family life.”131 Married fathers are more likely than married 
mothers to report making sacrifices in family time for the sake of their job, but 
they are also slightly more likely to report making sacrifices in their job for the 
sake of the family.132 It is unmarried mothers who are by far the most likely to 
report making sacrifices in both job and family for the sake of the other.133 Married 
mothers, who work the fewest paid hours, are the most content with their role 
balance. 
The gendered differential in time allocation and married parents’ satisfaction 
with it does not conform particularly well with what parents say they believe about 
a gendered division of work. Of people born between 1965 and 1981, 82% believe 
that “both parents should be equally involved in care giving.”134 Putting those 
beliefs together with the data on actual hours devoted to caretaking, it is striking 
that more parents are not dissatisfied with their role allocation. Also interesting, is 
the correlation between belief in gender egalitarianism and gendered work 
patterns. Education level is highly correlated with belief in gender equality, as is 
income level.135 Yet, the more wealth a married couple has, the more profound 
                                                 
130 Whether the total number of hours that men and women work is equal seems to 
depend on how completely they specialize along gender lines. In households where women 
perform no paid labor, men, on average, work more hours than women. In households in 
which women work outside the home (and do the bulk of unpaid labor), it is the women 
who work more hours. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 56. 
131 BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 139 (50% of married fathers and 52% of 
married mothers report feeling very successful in achieving work/family balance); see also 
Alan J. Hawkins et al., The Orientation Toward Domestic Labor Questionnaire: Exploring 
Dual-Earner Wives’ Sense of Fairness About Family Work, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 244, 244 
(1998) (“although dual-earner wives [in the United States] do two to three times the 
amount of domestic work their husbands do, less than one third of wives report the division 
of daily family work as unfair.”). 
132 BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 118, at 139 (20% of married men report sacrificing 
family time for career, versus only 14% of married women. 32% of married men report 
sacrificing job for family, versus 30% for married women.). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 128 fig.7.2. 
135 See Richard J. Harris & Juanita M. Firestone, Changes in Predictors of Gender 
Role Ideologies Among Women: A Multivariate Analysis, 38 SEX ROLES 239, 240 (1998) 
(linking commitment to gender equality and education); Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services, Cohabitation,, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United States 4 (2002), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf (linking marriage rate 
to education stating, “[i]n addition to race and employment status, other characteristics of 
individuals that have been found to be related to a higher probability of getting married 
include higher education and earnings.”). Education may teach people to believe in gender 
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their gender specialization tends to be.136 What can account for a feeling of success 
if one’s behavior so clearly deviates from one’s beliefs about gender equity? 
One answer may be capaciousness in the term “equality.” It is not precisely 
clear what people mean when they say that both parents should share equally. 
Perhaps people mean that the investment in caretaking should be comparable, or 
equal-on-major-decision-making, or at least close. Any of those understandings of 
equality, though, may muddle claims for SSM. Civil Unions are comparable and 
close to marriage. Is that enough? 
Another reason people may not be concerned about deviating from their 
reported beliefs about gender roles is that they underestimate the importance of 
gender in their own lives. Women may feel like they have successfully negotiated 
a paid/unpaid balance even though they do twice as much unpaid work as their 
spouses because norms of motherhood encourage them to do so much unpaid 
work. Interviews with mothers who have left or significantly diminished their paid 
work suggest as much. “I have more of a link [to my children] than my husband 
does.” “You can’t get away from the fact that women bear children.” “The day-to-
day stuff is harder for men.” “He doesn’t have the same guilt that I have. He 
doesn’t worry that it’s going to hurt them.” 137 
Men may feel comfortable doing so much less unpaid work in the home 
because masculinity norms strongly encourage them to participate in the 
workforce. Participating in the workforce allows men to compete, usually with 
other men, and competition is a hallmark of masculinity.138 Earning the bulk of the 
family’s money also allows men to define themselves as breadwinners and 
providers. As numerous scholars of fatherhood and masculinity have concluded, 
“the breadwinner role is socially defined as men’s primary family role.”139 
                                                 
equality, but it also enables them to make more money and the more money a couple 
makes, the more likely they are to lead gendered lives. See infra note 136. 
136 In addition to the figures cited above regarding women who can afford to be at 
home full-time, see Wallis, supra note 125, at 53; Ellman, supra note 127, at 459-60, 
consider these figures: 22% of women with professional degrees do not work at all so that 
they can stay home with their children, see Wallis, supra note 125, at 53, and only 41% of 
married mothers with post-graduate education work full-time.  Bianchi, supra note 118, at 
58. Only 33% of women with post-graduate education and at least one child under age six 
work full-time. Id. It is possible that all of these women with professional degrees are 
living off of their part-time salaries or accumulated wealth, but it is probably much more 
likely that the primary source of income to their household comes from a husband. 
137 All of these quotes are taken from women interviewed by Mary Blair-Loy in her 
book on women executives. See MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND 
FAMILY AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES 83-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003). 
138 ALLEN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL 
LEGACY 34 (1997) (men compete with each other for women and power in society). 
139 Joseph H. Pleck, Husbands’ Paid Work and Family Roles: Current Research 
Issues, in RESEARCH IN THE INTERWEAVE OF SOCIAL ROLES: JOBS AND FAMILIES 251, 305 
(Helena Z. Lopata & Joseph H. Pleck eds., JAI Press, Inc. 1983). 
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“[B]readwinning has remained the great unifying element in fathers’ lives. Its 
obligations . . . shape their sense of self, manhood and gender.”140 
In accounts of why and how many well-educated, formerly egalitarian couples 
divided roles along gender lines, participants report that paid work is simply more 
psychologically important to fathers than mothers.141 As Steven Nock writes in his 
study of how marriage functions in men’s lives, “[a husband] in his role as primary 
provider for the family, has committed himself to instrumental tasks that contribute 
to his gender identity as a man.”142 “[S]ome amount of differentiation (or 
inequality) in marriage contributes to what it means to ‘be’ a husband, and . . . 
what it means to conform to cultural ideals of masculinity.”143 If that inequality 
within marriage is essential to how marriage provides identity for its participants, 
will gay and lesbian couples be able to access comparable notions of identity 
through marriage? 
The importance of gender roles is evident in the incidence of marriage as 
well. Data collected on those who do not marry suggests that marital gender roles 
are more robust than marriage itself. Women who are likely to earn equal to or 
more than their husbands are much less likely to marry.144 This phenomenon is 
most profound at either end of the income scale. Studies of unmarried poor women 
indicate that though many of these women want to marry and have turned down 
marriage proposals from men, they remain single because they cannot find a 
suitable spouse.145 A suitable spouse, for them, would be one who would remain 
faithful, stay employed, and provide for the family.146 An unemployed spouse or a 
spouse who could not be relied upon, was not worthy of marriage. These women 
continue to believe in marriage, but marriage for them is an institution that requires 
men to assume certain roles. 
High-earning women have a related problem. One study found that for 
women between the ages of forty and forty-four, the percentage who have never 
                                                 
140 ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (Basic Books 
1993). 
141 BLAIR-LOY, supra note 137, at 68, 72, 84 (“[M]y husband loves his work. For him 
to make a change would be change of such magnitude, such importance to him personally . 
. . .” “I’m much more apt to be thinking about my kids than I am about work and I think 
that’s the difference . . . He’s just more distracted by work . . . .” “He would find it very 
difficult [to be the primary parent] . . . He’d be very antsy to get back to work.”); JOAN 
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 25-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (describing how women assume the burden of 
unpaid work because it is so important for their spouses to keep working long hours in paid 
work). 
142 NOCK, supra note 97, at 62. 
143 Id. at 132. 
144 Ellman, supra note 127, at 458-59. 
145 KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN 
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 130 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005). 
146 Id. at 126, 130. 
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married increases with education for every year beyond one year of college.147 This 
may be because, like poor women, high-earning women seek men who can 
perform the traditional provider role and the more women provide for themselves, 
the higher the standard they will set for their prospective spouses. Alternatively, it 
may be that men do not want to relinquish the traditional marital role and, 
therefore, prefer not to marry women who might earn as much as them. It may be 
both. Regardless, the patterns suggest that gender roles continue to play a 
prominent role in people’s understanding of what marriage is. 
The prevalence of gendered marital roles is often thought to be beyond the 
law’s reach. The law—and many people—view the marital relationship as a 
private one, entitled to a norm of non-interference.148 An individual couple’s 
decision to specialize along gender lines probably feels personal to them and a 
function of their unique attributes as a couple, even though if an employer or the 
government specialized in that same way it would raise serious equality concerns. 
Legal attempts to interfere with a couple’s allocation of marital roles would 
probably strike many as impermissibly invasive. 
Yet the gender patterns that continue to reproduce themselves in these 
seemingly private relationships have indisputable social force. They shape our 
understanding of what it means to be a mother and wife or a husband and father. 
This is precisely the point that critics of SSM make: by facilitating gender 
differentiation, the social institution of marriage helps reify gender roles. Marriage 
affords men and women the opportunity to live into separate gender roles in which 
both find satisfaction, and through which gender roles are perpetuated. 
Even if one thinks that the prevalence of gender roles simply represents 
revealed preferences in a situation in which the law is neutral, the current 
restrictions on SSM keep marriage gendered. If the expressive and constitutive 
benefits of marriage are inexplicably intertwined with the gendered nature of 
marriage, and if allowing same-sex couples to marry will undermine that gendered 
nature of marriage, then the state’s role cannot be considered neutral with regard to 
gender roles. By licensing marriage and restricting it to straight couples, the state 
reifies gender. But the state reifies gender precisely because the expressive and 
constitutive benefits of marriage are so important to people. In other words, that 
which makes marriage a fundamental right may, in and of itself, create a gender 
equality problem. 
Given that background of what marriage is and how it operates, it is 
appropriate to ask what same-sex couples are asking for when they ask for SSM. 
Are they claiming that marriage must not be gendered—that the law must interfere 
                                                 
147 Elaina Rose, Education, Hypergamy, and the “Success Gap,” 10 (Univ. of Wash., 
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 353330, 2006), available at http://www.econ.washing 
ton.edu/user/erose/hypergamy_solew.pdf. 
148 This norm of non-interference has pedigree in both the common law, see McGuire 
v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 345 (Neb. 1953) (court will not assume jurisdiction over 
parties’ distribution of resources within an ongoing marriage), and the Constitution, see 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (state cannot interfere with sanctity of 
marital decision-making about contraception). 
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to prevent the reproduction of traditional gender? Or, are they asking for a right to 
enter into an institution that will allow each to assume a gendered role, albeit a 
gender role that, for at least one-half of each couple, will not map onto his or her 
biological sex? As Part V will show, gender equality doctrine has often been 
reticent to eradicate gender roles altogether, particularly when they manifest 
themselves in private settings, and it has been quite ambivalent about allowing 
people to be alternatively gendered (i.e., to assume a role that does not map onto 
his or her biological sex). 
 
IV.  EQUALITY DOCTRINE 
 
This Part reviews the law of gender equality in three different contexts: 
employment cases involving dress codes, employment cases involving privacy and 
sexual preferences, and constitutional cases involving gender discrimination. As a 
doctrinal matter, only the constitutional doctrine is relevant. Sanctioning and 
licensing some marriages and not others involves quintessential state action. And, 
as a constitutional matter, the argument that the state cannot mandate certain 
gender roles within marriage seems quite strong.149 But, just as Part IV suggested 
that there was cultural ambivalence about what gender equality might mean and 
require, the doctrine explored here suggests that there is legal ambivalence over 
what gender equality may mean or require. 
 
A.  The Grooming Cases 
 
The law of gender equality is most routinely tested and created under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal statute that prohibits discrimination 
in employment on the basis of sex.150 Within this field, in a set of cases known as 
the “dress” or “grooming” cases, employers are allowed to establish separate but 
equal rules on the basis of gender and they are allowed to take into account private 
biases, i.e., community norms, when hiring and retaining workers. Admittedly, the 
permitted accommodation of gender roles is bounded. Employers are not allowed 
to segregate job categories (employers cannot channel women into traditionally 
female jobs and men into traditionally male jobs);151 nor are they allowed to 
exaggerate gender roles in ways that may be detrimental to one sex.152 But, they 
                                                 
149 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 190-193. 
150 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 124, at §2000a. 
151 Though employers are not required to adjust pay across categories if employees’ 
personal preferences are such that women choose to work in some of the less lucrative, 
non-commissioned fields (selling apparel and cosmetics) and men choose to work in the 
more lucrative, commissioned fields (selling major items like appliances and furnaces). 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1988). 
152 Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services Inc. 808 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Va., 1992) 
(denying summary judgment to employer who told employee to wear high heels because 
her legs were sexy); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 
30 JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES [VOL. 12 
  
are allowed to impose separate hair length requirements on men and women.153 
They can require women, but not men, to wear skirts,154 and men, but not women, 
to wear neckties.155 Men are not necessarily entitled to wear effeminate clothing,156 
and men can be prohibited from wearing jewelry.157 
One of the most recent “grooming” cases involved a bartender who 
complained about a company policy that made her wear make-up and cut her hair 
in a certain style.158 Her male co-workers were not required to wear make-up or 
wear their hair in that style.159 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit wrote, “[t]he 
material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, but 
whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an unequal burden for [her] 
gender.”160 In other words, difference itself does not constitute inequality. Separate 
can be equal as long as it is not unduly burdensome. 
In a well-publicized grooming case involving a broadcast journalist who was 
fired because of declining audience approval numbers attributable to her 
appearance, the court wrote that different specific appearance criteria for women 
and men “do not implicate the primary thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt 
employers to ‘discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment 
disadvantages for one sex.’”161 The District Court had made clear that there was 
nothing wrong with tailoring grooming requirements to conform to “community 
standards.”162 In other words, private biases can matter and it is only outmoded 
stereotypes that must go. 
The grooming cases’ blatant rejection of equality principles that seem core in 
the racial context has, not surprisingly, generated a fair amount of commentary. 
Some writers feel strongly that the accommodation of gender roles, no matter how 
understandable, is pernicious and ultimately undermines what should be the thrust 
of equality doctrine. To this group, the manifestation of gender is the problem; 
gender distinction and sex discrimination are one in the same thing.163 Mary Anne 
                                                 
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down employer policy that required women to wear 
sexually revealing uniform when men could wear street clothes). 
153 Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
154 Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979). 
155 Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
156 Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 538 (Wash. 1993) (denying claim of a man fired 
for wearing “‘excessively’ feminine attire,” including a string of pearls). 
157 Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). 
158 Jaspersen v. Harrah, 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Frank v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854-55, and Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 
602, 605-06). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1110. 
161 Craft v. Metromedia, 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Knott v. Mo. 
Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975)). 
162 Craft v. Metromedia, 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (D.C. Mo. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part by Craft v. Metromedia, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
163 See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995) 
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Case argues that “the world will not be safe for women in frilly pink dresses . . . 
unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”164 Taylor Flynn 
suggests that employer bans on male employees wearing earrings are nothing more 
than penalties on men for failing to conform “to the masculine gender role 
expectation that men do not accessorize.”165 Katherine Franke suggests that “Title 
VII should recognize the primacy of gender norms as the root of . . . sex 
discrimination, and . . . prohibit all forms of normative gender stereotyping . . . . 
”166 
Others have taken a more accommodating approach. Katharine Bartlett uses 
the grooming cases to point out the indeterminacy of the term equality. She writes 
“[t]here can be no abstract all-purpose definition of equality that fits all times and 
places.”167 Instead she says the focus of equality doctrine should be on whether 
gender classifications further gender-based disadvantages and this, she argues, 
requires more, not less, attention to community norms (i.e., private biases).168 
Robert Post writes that  
 
[i]t is . . . implausible to read Title VII as mandating that gender 
conventions be obliterated . . . . [We should not be required] to imagine a 
world of sexless individuals, but . . . [should] instead . . . explore the 
precise ways in which Title VII should alter the norms by which sex is 
given social meaning.169  
 
Kimberly Yuracko suggests that courts use a “power-access approach” that “makes 
actionable those, and only those, types of sex-specific trait discrimination that arise 
out of gender norms and gender scripts that reinforce sex hierarchy in the 
workplace.”170 She goes on to argue that if courts were to prohibit all forms of 
gender role distinction and force a convergence “toward an androgynous mean,” 
                                                 
(“We are in danger of substituting for prohibited sex discrimination a still acceptable 
gender discrimination . . . .”). 
164 Id. at 7-8. 
165 Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender 
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 
401 (2001). 
166 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 95 (1995). 
167 Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms and Workplace Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 
2579 (1994). 
168 Id. at 2545 (“Because what constitutes disadvantage, as well as what it takes to 
reduce that disadvantage and even what reducing that disadvantage means, can only be 
determined in context . . . I conclude that the evaluation of equality claims under Title VII 
requires more, not less, attention to community norms.”). 
169 Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000) (emphasis added). 
170 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument 
Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 172 (2004). 
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women would likely be disadvantaged because they would be forced into a male 
norm that would inhibit their freedom without materially increasing anyone 
else’s.171 
Gendered dress codes serve no other purpose than to accommodate social 
norms, that is, private biases, and thereby reify and reproduce gender. If, as the 
current law and numerous commentators seem to suggest, dress codes do not 
necessarily offend equality principles, some institutional reification of gender must 
be permissible. Perhaps marriage serves a comparable purpose.  
To be sure, there is Title VII jurisprudence that seems to cabin the grooming 
cases. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins172 the Supreme Court suggested that Title 
VII prohibited all sex stereotyping by employers.173 The plaintiff in that case, Mary 
Ann Hopkins, was denied partnership at a prestigious accounting firm because, the 
trial court found, partners at the firm disapproved of her masculine behavior.174 
It seems unlikely that in protecting Mary Ann Hopkins’ right to mimic the 
aggressive style of the men who had made partner at Price-Waterhouse, the 
Supreme Court meant to rid the workplace of all manifestations of gender 
conformity.175 The Ninth Circuit, in Jesperson v. Harrah,176 found reasonable 
                                                 
171 Id. at 202-03.  
 
The employer who does not want to employ men in bob haircuts will simply not 
make this an option under its dress code, even if it does not mind women 
wearing them. The result is not more options for men to gender bend but fewer 
traditionally gender-conforming options for women. 
 
Consider also the case of Shannon Faulkner, who did not want to get a buzz cut when 
she entered The Citadel precisely because the deleterious effects of getting a buzz cut 
would be much greater on her (given socially accepted gender roles) than it would be on 
men. See Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally 
Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 70-71 (2002) At a preliminary 
injunction hearing, the district court refused to enjoin the buzz cut and Faulkner got one, 
shortly before she withdrew from The Citadel because the harassment she received once 
there was overwhelming. See id. Presumably, the gender-role eliminators, see supra notes 
163-166, would approve of the district court’s decision, but others, see supra notes 167-
170, might want a more nuanced approach. 
172 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Stender v. 
Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
173 “We are beyond the day when an employer can evaluate employees by assuming 
or insisting they match the stereotypes associated with their group.”  Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 251.  
174 For a more detailed description of the Price Waterhouse case, see Yuracko, supra 
note 170, at 180.  
175 Id. at 171, 188-202 (suggesting that Price Waterhouse is better thought of “as an 
articulation of a trait equality requirement” and going on to explore the problems with a 
trait equality approach). 
176 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).  For a 
discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 158-160.  
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gendered grooming requirements to be consistent with Price-Waterhouse.177 The 
problem in Price-Waterhouse, according to the Ninth Circuit, was that gender 
conformity would have undermined Mary Ann Hopkins’ attempt to make 
partner.178 In contrast, wearing make-up would not have interfered with Darlene 
Jesperson’s ability to bartend.179   
The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem,180 a case involving a male-to-
female transsexual, seems to have reasoned differently, stating “discrimination 
against a plaintiff who is transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify 
with his or her gender—is no different from discrimination directed against Mary 
Ann Hopkins.”181 The full meaning of Smith is indeterminate though. Smith’s 
superiors attempted to fire him only after they learned of his intention to complete 
a male to female physical transformation. It may have been his intention to actually 
become a woman, not stay a man who tended to act in a feminine manner, that 
triggered the employment action. 182 And there is something deeply ironic about 
prohibiting employers from demanding some conformity to gender stereotypes in 
the name of protecting a plaintiff who desperately wanted to conform to a gender 
stereotype—albeit one different than the one society had originally assigned to 
him.  
As scholar Anna Kirkland observes after discussing these cases “gender 
stereotyping as a legal idea lives quite comfortably with inconsistency.”183 The 
simple point to be emphasized in the SSM context is that anti-discrimination law, 
as articulated in Title VII jurisprudence, sends mixed messages about the extent to 
which the law is willing to condone gender stereotypes and mandatory gender 
conformity. 
 
B.  Privacy and Sex  
 
The other contexts in which Title VII condones gender distinctions have to do 
with customer preferences that are explicitly linked to customer privacy concerns 
or sexual preferences. Thus, nursing homes, hospital delivery room nursing staff, 
and agencies that hire nursing aides or others who are likely to have physical 
contact with clients (or see them nude), can discriminate on the basis of sex.184 In 
                                                 
177 Id. at 1109-11. 
178 Id. at 1110. 
179 Id.  
180 Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).  
181 Id. at 575. 
182 Management may have simply been prejudiced against transsexuals. Id. at 569.   
183 ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 89 
(N.Y. Univ. Press 2008). 
184 See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(permitting sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for psychiatric hospital 
staff treating emotionally disturbed and sexually abused children and adolescents, noting 
that because “[c]hild patients often [had to be] accompanied to the bathroom, and 
sometimes . . . bathed”); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 
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explaining these cases, Robert Post suggests that courts may take sex into 
consideration, especially in some contexts, because “[g]ender is highly salient in 
matters of privacy. The sex of the person by whom we are seen or touched 
normally matters very much to us.”185 Whatever our commitments to gender 
equality, they do not necessarily trump the values we place on protecting personal 
privacy preferences.186 
Commentators and courts have also suggested that jobs can be segregated on 
the basis of sex when sexual titillation goes to the essence of the service provided, 
be it burlesque, lap dancing or Playboy Bunny service.187 Courts are less willing to 
suspend equality principles in the sexual titillation context than in the privacy 
context, but the more explicitly sexual the business, the more acceptable the sex 
discrimination. Most commentators concede that being a woman is a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for working in a strip club, at least one that 
caters to men.188 
Two things are worth noting about the privacy and sexual titillation cases. 
First, in neither context would the racial preferences of consumers be allowed to 
trump. No one suggests that an obstetric patient could request a white nurse over 
an African-American nurse, even though she can request a female nurse over a 
                                                 
1987) (The job duties of male and female nurse assistants and male orderlies often require 
that such employee view or touch the private parts of their patients.); Fesel v. Masonic 
Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-53 (D.C. Del. 1978) (“The Home has the 
responsibility of providing twenty-four hour supervision and care of its elderly guests. 
Fulfillment of that responsibility necessitates intimate personal care including dressing, 
bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter care. Each of these functions 
involves a personal touching . . . .”). But see Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 
1052, 1068 (D. Ariz. 1999) (finding against using gender as a BFOQ for a massage 
therapist position). 
185 Post, supra note 169, at 26. 
186 Alhough, Kimberly Yuracko points out that allowing privacy concerns to trump 
equality principles in the privacy cases in not likely to have a disparate impact on one 
particular sex. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 181 (2004). “[W]hile women may 
be denied certain jobs to protect men’s privacy, men will be denied the same range of jobs 
to protect women’s privacy.” Id. 
187 See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 
43.02(2) (1992) (citing burlesque, go-go dancers and chorus line kicker as jobs for which 
authenticity requires distinguishing on the basis of sex). Although changing norms in the 
last thirty years have made Playboy Clubs all but obsolete, when Title VII first passed, 
New York administrative commissions found it permissible for the Clubs to discriminate in 
hiring Bunnies. St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Case No. CSF 22618-70, Appeal No. 773 (N.Y. 
Hum. Rts. Appeal Board Dec. 17, 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Case No. CSF 22619-70, 
Appeal No. 774 (N.Y. Hum. Rts. Appeal Board Dec. 17, 1971). 
188 Title VII allows discrimination in cases where being a particular sex is considered 
a necessary part of the job. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination 
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 205-06 
(1992) (citing LARSON & LARSON, supra note 187, at § 15.10) (discussing strip clubs). 
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male one. Comparably, the Hefner organization would not be allowed to 
discriminate on the basis of race in hiring Playboy Bunnies. Second, recall that this 
is an article about marriage. Whatever else marriage is, it is an institution that 
people strongly associate with privacy and sex, yet those are areas in which the 
doctrine suggests that equality interests may be trumped. 
 
C.  Constitutional Gender Equality 
 
As suggested above, notwithstanding the Title VII jurisprudence 
accommodating gender roles, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down as 
unconstitutional sex-based classifications that were rooted in provider/caretaker 
stereotypes. The armed services cannot assume that wives of service men are 
dependent on their spouses if they do not make the same assumption about 
husbands of service women.189 The Social Security Administration cannot 
differentiate between widows and widowers when awarding survivor benefits.190 
All statutes authorizing courts to order alimony or spousal maintenance payments 
must be sex neutral.191 States cannot distinguish between male and female 
children’s entitlement to child support.192 
Not that long after these cases were decided, Professor Wendy Williams 
suggested that the Supreme Court struck down so many of these sex-based 
distinctions so quickly in the 1970s because it “recognize[d] that the real world 
outside the courtroom had already changed. Women were in fact no longer chiefly 
housewife-dependents. The family wage no longer existed . . . .”193 Williams was 
certainly right that the real world had changed by the early 1970s, but that change, 
to the extent it has continued, has not resulted in the elimination or gender roles. 
Women may not be as dependent on men as they were in 1965, but as a relative 
matter, most married women are still dependent on their husbands. The marital 
home may not produce the same gender roles as it did in 1965, but the sociological 
data strongly suggest that it still produces gender. And, importantly, many men and 
women are content with the way in which marriage does so. 
If the Supreme Court were to look at the real world now and realize that 
gender roles have proved so remarkably resilient, would that be relevant 
constitutionally? Would marriage’s role in reifying gender roles require a 
degendering of marriage or an acceptance of its gendered nature? The 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding sex-based classifications in other areas does 
not necessarily render a clear answer. 
                                                 
189 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973). 
190 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 202 (1977). 
191 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979). 
192 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 8 (1975). 
193 Williams, supra note 17, at 155 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics News 1 (Nov. 15, 1981)). (Williams’ article was published in 1992, but she 
started working on it in 1982, a date closer to when the sex discrimination cases were 
decided than to the present.). 
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First, the initial question that the Supreme Court asks when it is addressing 
questions of whether a certain statute or policy violates the Constitution’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination is whether men and women are similarly 
situated. The Equal Protection Clause requires that men and women be treated 
comparably only if they are similarly situated.194 Sometimes they are not. Rules 
that assign citizenship differently based on whether it is a foreign-born child’s 
mother or father who is a United States citizen do not violate the Equal Protection 
clause because mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with regard to 
parenthood of newborns.195 Comparably, states are allowed to have gendered rules 
with regard to relinquishing one’s parental rights (usually in the context of 
adoption) because, unless fathers have developed a relationship with their children, 
they are not similarly situated to mothers, who have a relationship by virtue of 
pregnancy.196 Thus, the constitutional question for SSM may be whether same-sex 
couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples. If one of the primary 
purposes of marriage is to help produce and reify gender identity, then same-sex 
couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with regard to marriage. 
Indeed, the existence of SSM may undermine the purpose of marriage by making 
gender role construction more a matter of personal choice than socially accepted 
norms. 
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has suggested (as did some of the courts 
in the grooming cases) that gender discrimination is constitutional as long as it is 
not the result of rank, non-contemplative stereotyping. Thus, in Rostker v. 
Goldberg, the Court upheld a compulsory draft registration system for men 
because “Congress did not act ‘unthinkingly’ or ‘reflexively’ . . . .”197 “[T]he 
decision to exempt women from registration was not the “accidental by-product of 
a traditional way of thinking about females.”198 “The question of registering 
women for the draft . . . received considerable national attention and was the 
subject of wide-ranging public debate . . . .”199 Comparably, whatever the origins 
of prohibitions on SSM (which may well have been reflexive and unthinking), gay 
                                                 
194 See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (longer periods for 
promotion acceptable for women because men and women were “not similarly situated 
with respect to opportunities for professional service.”). 
195 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001) (son of Vietnamese mother and American 
father not a citizen even though son of Vietnamese father and American mother would be). 
196 Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (biological father could block 
adoption of child by mother’s husband because biological father and mother had shared 
parenting duties once the children are born), with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 
(1983) (biological father of child could not block the adoption by mother’s husband 
because biological father had not developed a relationship with child). 
197 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72 (1981); see also Craft  v. Metromedia, 766 
F.2d 1205, 1216  (8th Cir. 1985) (suggesting Title VII’s primary thrust was only to 
“discard outmoded sex stereotypes”) (emphasis added) (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 
527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975). 
198 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)). 
199 Id. at 72.  
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marriage has now been the subject of wide-ranging political dialogue. Few states 
that continue to ban SSM are doing so as an “accidental by-product of traditional 
ways” of thinking about marriage. They are doing so in the midst of a vigorous 
debate about what marriage means.200 Most of the states that prohibit SSM have 
had recent referenda on the issue.201 If the social meaning of marriage is contested 
in an open and deliberative way, then a discrimination doctrine aimed at 
prohibiting reflexive stereotypes may not require that marriage be defined in one 
way or another. 
Ironically, while those states that have had referenda on SSM may shield 
themselves from claims of non-contemplative stereotyping, they open themselves 
up to claims of animus against gays and lesbians. The recent attempts to codify 
marriage as heterosexual were born in a movement in which open antipathy to 
gays and lesbians was commonplace.202 
A finding of animus makes the analogy to race more salient, thus bolstering 
the claim that separate cannot be equal and the level of scrutiny a court is likely to 
use in evaluating marriage statutes. Still, given how scholarship has argued that 
discrimination against gays and lesbians is sex discrimination,203 and given the 
lack of animus in Story #6, one would expect courts to exert more effort in 
explaining why race and not sex discrimination doctrine should control. As 
Professor Stephen Clark has succinctly summarized, “classifications based on sex 
are not inherently suspect . . . .”204 Classifications based on race are. To the extent 
that the Supreme Courts in Iowa, Connecticut and California are saying that 
classifications based on sexual orientation are inherently suspect, one would think 
they would need to explain why discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
more like race discrimination than sex discrimination. 
The strongest and most helpful gender discrimination case for SSM advocates 
is United States v. Virginia205 (“VMI”). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the Virginia Military Institute’s interest in keeping an environment in which 
“[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, [and] absence of 
privacy . . .” were stressed—an environment that was much easier to maintain with 
an all-male population—could not justify excluding women.206 The Court ruled 
                                                 
200 See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc. 
org/documents/marriage_prohibitions.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (map of the U.S. 
showing which states have a constitutional amendment, or a state law limiting marriage to 
one man and one woman). 
201 See id. 
202 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra note 16 (articles suggesting that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is sex discrimination). 
204 Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 107, 165 (2002). 
205 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
206 Id. at 522. 
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that the state must proffer an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding 
women from this bastion of masculinity.207 Virginia could not meet this burden. 
Under one reading of VMI, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause ensured women access to state-sponsored environments that promote and 
reify masculinity. Under this reading, same-sex couples should be entitled to enter 
into the institution of marriage because those couples have a right to access state-
sponsored environments that promote gender roles even if those roles do not map 
onto a particular person’s biological sex. What this account fails to consider 
though is how readily the Supreme Court conceded that equality principles 
required nothing more than separate but equal accommodations. 
The acceptance of separate but equal standards is most obvious in the 
discussion that occupied most of the VMI Court’s opinion, to wit, whether the 
alternative program that Virginia had made available to women interested in a 
military-like education provided equal opportunity. In response to early losses in 
the litigation, Virginia had developed a program—Virginia Women’s Institute for 
Leadership (“VWIL”)—at Mary Baldwin College, which offered an all-female 
option for women who wanted a militaristic experience. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion details how VWIL did not offer anywhere near as 
rigorous military training as VMI did. The women students did not need to “live 
together . . . eat meals together . . .,” or experience the “spartan living 
arrangements designed to foster an ‘egalitarian ethic’”208 Moreover, Mary Baldwin 
College had vastly inferior sports facilities, a faculty that held “significantly fewer 
Ph.D.s, and receive[d] substantially lower salaries,” and “no courses in engineering 
or . . . advanced math and physics . . . .”209 In short, the Court readily found that 
separate was not equal because the separate schools were funded and supported at 
completely different levels.210 
The Court’s discussion in VMI is distinctly different than the Court’s 
discussion forty-two years earlier in Brown v. Board of Education. In Brown the 
Court wrote “there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved 
have been equalized, or are being equalized with respect to . . . ‘tangible’ factors. 
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible 
factors . . . .”211 Instead, the court focused on the “hearts and minds” of the 
African-American children and on the psychological harm they were likely to 
suffer because “[t]o separate them . . . solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority.”212 
Separating genders is not usually so interpreted. Unisex bathrooms are rarer 
than gendered ones. Neither women nor men walk through a department store 
                                                 
207 Id. at 524. 
208 Id. at 548 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1424 
(W.D. Va. 1991)). 
209 Id. at 551-52. 
210 Id. 
211 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (citing Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D.C. Kan. 1951)). 
212 Id. 
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feeling inferior because women’s clothes are in one place and the men’s clothes in 
another.213 In VMI, the Supreme Court gave no indication that the VWIL option 
was inherently unequal because it was separate.214 If a fully funded, adequately 
staffed Mary Baldwin College facility would have passed constitutional muster, 
then VMI cannot be read to hold that women are necessarily entitled to be 
alternatively gendered.215 
There are further indications of slippery notions of equality in VMI. When 
explaining that VMI was obligated to open its programs to women the Court 
dropped a curious footnote: “admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require 
alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other in 
living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of physical training programs.”216 Why 
would equality doctrine undoubtedly require this? Shouldn’t equality doctrine 
prevent such an accommodation? Is this another example of privacy trumping 
equality? Presumably, the Court was concerned about women’s safety,217 but that 
concern leads one to conclude that equality requires protecting women from 
violent masculinity even as equality entitles women to it. 218 
                                                 
213 The degree of outrage stemming from gender distinction appears to be contextual. 
Many people are upset when children’s toy stores segregate toys on the basis of gender 
even if they are not upset by the segregation of adult apparel. Perhaps this is because 
people recognize that adult women and adult men have “real” physical differences that 
necessitate different clothing styles, while boy and girl children are thought to have fewer 
“real” differences. But undoubtedly, the difference in style between men and women’s 
clothing vastly exceeds any “real” difference in body type and many, many parents watch 
in amazement as boy and girl children seem to demonstrate “real” differences. 
214 See Clark, supra note 204, at 166-67 (“[S]ex equality law has no analogue to 
Brown v. Board of Education or any parallel proposition that merely drawing a sex-based 
line is inherently unequal or necessarily stamps one sex or the other with a badge of 
inferiority.”). 
215 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred separately to show his support for single-sex 
education and to demonstrate that Virginia could solve the dilemma by providing a fully 
comparable facility for women. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564-66 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Apparently, Chief Judge Rehnquist was unsure whether the 
majority would ever accept a separate but equal facility. But the majority spends most of its 
analysis demonstrating how the separate facility is inferior, not explaining—as the Brown 
court did—why a separate facility must be inferior. 
216 Id. at 550, n.19. 
217 The level of sexual assault and harassment at some military academies has proven 
to be astounding. See Vojdik, supra note 171, at 101-02. 
218 It is worth noting that the masculinity usually reified at military academies is very 
different than the masculinity that marriage is supposed to produce. Indeed, believers in the 
inherently gendered nature of marriage might argue that marriage is necessary precisely 
because it provides for men a much more caring, cooperative and responsible masculine 
template. Military academies are infamous for their misogynistic norms. Pursuant to those 
norms, women are seen as weak; if men are to interact with them at all it is to abuse or rape 
them. See Vojdik, supra note 171, at 68-69. 
Modern marriage suggests something very different about male and female 
interactions. According to the gender norms of marriage, men and women are different but 
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A rich conception of gender equality can reconcile the apparent contradiction 
of women being entitled to both protection from and access to masculinity norms. 
Arguably, women must be granted entrance to those institutions that have afforded 
men power precisely because men have gained that power at women’s expense. 
The process of integration into those institutions will be dangerous and difficult. 
Therefore, women must be protected from private individuals who will seek to 
thwart their access to power. Women’s access to power is what equality doctrine 
protects. 
This richer conception of equality is not necessarily applicable in the SSM 
context. What is it that equality doctrine will protect for same-sex couples? Is it the 
right to be alternatively gendered or the right to degender marriage? The benefits 
that opposite-sex couples gain in marriage have not necessarily come at same-sex 
couples’ expense. For sure, as the California Supreme Court recognized, there is a 
respect and dignity that accompanies most opposite-sex marriages and same-sex 
couples have been denied that respect and dignity, but so has everyone who does 
not get married. Many marriage critics have argued that the respect and dignity that 
accompanies married people has come mostly at the expense of single people.219 
The accolades that accompany marriage may also be a function of the social 
praise that accompanies living into one’s socially programmed gender identity. 
Marriage is much more about the absence of choice than the exercise of it. The 
purpose of opposite-sex marriage may be to make good men and women, with 
responsible masculine and feminine characteristics. This is only possible 
(according to Story #6) if the individuals are not free to choose their own gender 
identity. Entering marriage is seen as a rite of passage because it involves 
accepting the more restrictive world of roles. Living within those roles is 
celebrated as a sign of maturity. 
                                                 
that difference is to be respected. One’s job is to love the other, not denigrate it. One’s 
responsibility is to care for and nurture the other and to let the other care for and nurture 
you. In historical context, or in the context of a broad understanding of how gender reflects 
power, gendered marriage may just be misogyny more pleasingly dressed up as a separate-
but-equal regime, but many people would reject the idea of gendered marriage as 
misogynistic, even while accepting that the masculinity of the military academies is 
misogynistic. Those social understandings of gender roles and how they operate may 
matter in political and legal discussions of who is entitled to marriage and why. For many, 
gendered marriage offers a non-misogynistic alternative for masculine identity and 
therefore gendered marriage has tremendous social value. And, equality doctrine 
(sometimes) suggests that as long as gender norms are benign, they are acceptable. 
219 See Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminist Feminism Forgot the Single 
Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 passim (2004) (exploring the advantages of non-married 
life and questioning why the law should support marriage); Laura Rosenbury, Friends with 
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, passim (2007) (exploring how “friends might serve 
many of the functions that the law reserves for family.”); Katherine M. Franke, Sexuality 
and Marriage: The Politcs of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 
244-45 (2006) (criticizing the “lesbigay” movements’ adoption of marriage norms at the 
expense of celebrating sexuality unbound by marriage). 
2010] THE STORIES OF MARRIAGE 41 
 
In his very thoughtful explication of the miscegenation analogy in the SSM 
context, Stephen Clark argues that because Brown has no analogue in sex 
discrimination doctrine,220 the determination of whether SSM restrictions are sex 
discrimination must be based on pre-Brown discrimination doctrine, particularly 
Sweatt v. Painter,221 from which the majority quoted liberally in VMI.222 The 
operative question that emerges from the pre-Brown era is whether a classification 
affords different groups “substantially equal” opportunities.223 Clark concludes that 
SSM bans and even civil union options do not afford gay individuals substantially 
equal opportunities. 
Critical to Clark’s analysis is his observation that equal protection rights are 
“personal rights” that ensure that individuals must be entitled to opportunities that 
are substantially equal to the opportunities that other individuals (of different races 
or sexes) enjoy.224 But in the marriage context, they are individual rights to a legal 
status that gets much of its import and significance, and therefore, much of its 
constitutional stature, from social norms. If, given the gendered nature of modern 
marriage, marriages between same-sex partners will not be experienced as 
substantially equal or the same as marriages between opposite-sex partners, does 
that mean that same-sex couples do not have a right to them? Are same-sex 
couples even asking for a right to the same institution? Once again, the legal 
analysis of the SSM question depends on the story one tells about marriage. 
Whether consciously or not, the reason the courts of California, Connecticut 
and Iowa may have latched onto race, not sex, discrimination doctrine is that there 
is much less ambivalence about the meaning of equality in the race context. 
Separate is not equal when it comes to race and the law does not accommodate 
racist biases. If prohibiting SSM is discrimination against gays and lesbians 
because they are gays and lesbians, and sexual orientation is a suspect 
classification like race, then courts can avoid the ambivalent nature of sex equality 
doctrine and at least elide the hard task of defining marriage. Still, given the well-
known argument that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination225 
given how central gender has always been to marriage, and given how a gendered 
understanding of marriage undermines the applicability of the racial analogy, it is a 
bit surprising that the predominant analogy has been to race. At a minimum, one 
would expect courts to explain why the more accommodating approach to gender 
discrimination should not be adopted in equality discussions of SSM. 
                                                 
220 See Clark, supra note 204, at 165 (“[c]lassifications based on sex are not 
inherently suspect.”). 
221 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
222 Clark, supra note 204, at 173-74.   
223 Id. at 174. 
224 Clark, supra note 204, at 178-79 (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). 
225 See sources cited, supra note 16. 
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D.  The Law of Marriage 
 
Finally, a note on the irony of using equality doctrine to secure rights to 
marriage. Much of the law of marriage, and particularly the law of marriage 
dissolution exists because gender roles exist. Arguably, the reason marital property 
regimes assume that all income and property earned during the marriage should be 
split equally, and the reason spousal maintenance regimes require one spouse to 
support the other after the marriage is over, is because of the strong likelihood that 
spouses will be dissimilarly situated. The law of marital dissolution is designed to 
treat “unalikes alike.”226 The more similarly situated the spouses are, the less we 
need a law of marital dissolution. 
Few people advocate dispensing with marital property or maintenance rules. 
Treating unalikes as comparably entitled at the end of a marriage strikes most 
people as justified, necessary, and fair, but it has little to do with traditional 
equality doctrine.227 This does not preclude plaintiffs from making equality claims 
to enter the institution,228 but it does shed light on how and why equality arguments 
may seem inapt. 
What is it that SSM couples are being deprived of if the purpose of marriage 
is to make sure that women get compensated for the unpaid work that they do, and 
that men retain responsibilities for the dependencies they have enabled? Won’t 
most same-sex couples look much more similarly situated than most husbands and 
wives, and might that realization undermine the family law rules that have 
protected women because they are not similarly situated? The modern trend—even 
in non-community property states—to distribute property equally at divorce and 
the modern defense of spousal maintenance almost always makes explicit 
reference to the need to protect women.229 Will the arguments for joint property 
and spousal maintenance seem as compelling if the dependent role is chosen in 
                                                 
226 Aristotle famously described equality as treating likes alike and unalikes unalike. 
See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA v. 3 1121a-1131b, 113 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson 
eds & W. Ross trans., 1980) (“this is the origin of quarrels and complaints – when either 
equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares.”) For more 
discussion of Aristotle’s influence on the law of gender equality, see CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 4-10 (2001). 
227 See June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 78 (2002); 
Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 721 passim (1993); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead, Beyond a New Theory of 
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 passim (1994); Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender 
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 passim (1989) (all arguing that maintenance is necessary as a 
way of compensating women for their unpaid family work). 
228 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967), the case in which the Supreme Court 
struck down miscegenation laws is an example of when an equality claim could be made in 
a way that would have no bearing on the law of marital dissolution. 
229 See sources cited, supra note 227. 
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defiance of social norms instead of in compliance with them? Will we need more 
proof from gay couples than we do from straight ones that their marital roles were 
explicitly negotiated such that one person promised to provide and the other 
promised to do more unpaid work? Or, will we assume that it is marriage, not 
gender, that leads to role specialization? Why, after all, should the law condone 
marital roles given their tendency to leave so many people so vulnerable? 
Infusing equality principles into the law of marriage leads to a host of these 
disruptive questions. People eager to understand what marriage is, how it 
functions, and whether it is worth the acclaim it receives may welcome these 
questions, but proponents of SSM cannot realistically assert that the questions are 
not disruptive. Sorting through the answers to these questions might well change 
marriage as we know it. 
 
V.  ANOTHER STORY 
 
Story #6 accurately describes the way marriage functions in many married 
people’s lives. But it need not represent a marital ideal and its descriptive accuracy 
does not preclude people from believing that the essence of marriage is about 
something other than its gendering function. Marriage may be a gender factory, but 
it does not have to be. And, if a competing story of marriage can emerge as 
dominant, the descriptive accuracy of Story #6 becomes less important. 
In this last Part, I offer another story of marriage, one that incorporates 
aspects of many of the previous marriage narratives, one that can be reconciled 
with the doctrine that suggests that marriage is a fundamental right, yet one that 
would compel states to license SSM. However, it is a discourse that challenges 
many modern understandings of what marriage should be. 
 
A.  Story #7 
 
Marriage marks the creation of a legal family. That family serves as a critical 
source of identity for its members. The law assumes and facilitates both material 
and emotional interdependence within that family in order to make it more stable 
and efficient. Material interdependence arises from the roles that are assumed 
when the parties specialize in different kinds of marital contributions, and from the 
reliance that develops over time in a relationship marked by sharing. Emotional 
interdependence—which usually includes a sexual relationship—arises from the 
sense of connection that leads the parties to want to marry. One of the main 
purposes of marriage is to raise children. 
 
1.  Marriage as a Fundamental Right and an Equality Right 
 
If Story #7 describes marriage, gays and lesbians should have a right to it both 
because marriage is a fundamental right and because gays and lesbians are 
similarly situated to straight couples with regard to marriage. Just as Story #1 
suggested, the state has an interest in defining and maintaining the legal institution 
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of marriage because of the way in which legal marriage promotes stability and 
efficiency. The state facilitates marital interdependence by providing the rights and 
obligations that bind the parties to each other and enable marital role development. 
As various courts and legislatures have found, there is no good reason to deny 
same-sex couples access to these rights and obligations.230 
As Story #2 suggested, because of the role marriage plays in shaping peoples’ 
identities and because of the expressive and constitutive benefits that flow from 
marriage, marriage cannot be viewed as only this bundle of rights and obligations. 
It is a lasting social institution, accompanied by a rich set of norms and 
expectations that both restrict and enrich its participants. These restrictions and 
expectations have traditionally included, but need not include gender role 
conformity. The enrichment that marriage provides does not need to come from 
living into a responsible masculinity or femininity (Story #6), but can come from 
living into a responsible role as spouse. 
As with the traditional masculine and feminine roles, the role of spouse 
requires a relinquishment of self, a doing for others, and a conformity with external 
norms that involves subjugating autonomy and self-interest. 231 But also, as with 
the traditional masculine and feminine roles, fulfilling the role of spouse allows for 
transcendence of self and a realization of a new identity.232 Thus, marriage 
involves a kind of self-realization that stems from connection, not gender.233 
Through this connection, which is re-inforced by both social and legal norms, 
married people become something new. If the state is to deny people the ability to 
tap into this rich set of norms in order to express and constitute themselves through 
                                                 
230 See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 911 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris,  908 A.2d 
196 218 (N.J. 2006), (requiring the states to provide Civil Union status to gay and lesbian 
couples). The state legislatures of New Hampshire, Connecticut, and California have also 
granted Civil Union status based on this reasoning. See Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex 
Relationships Nationwide, Oct. 5, 2009,  http://lambdalegal.org/nationwide-status-same-
sex-relationships.html, providing a summary of state legislation giving same-sex couples 
relationship status. 
231 See Regan, supra note 101, at 2088-89, and Bartlett, supra note 101, at 301 
(discussing the ways in which accepting the responsibility of certain roles can be a sign of 
growth and ennoblement.). 
232 As Milton Regan writes, “spouses . . . don’t simply help each other construct 
separate individual identities . . . [T]hey participate in the creation of a shared identity.” 
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 94 (1993); see also 
Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 636 (1980) (“our 
intimate associations are powerful influences over the development of our personalities.”); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 81 
(1993) (discussing loyalty to one’s spouse as an instance where the self and other blend 
together). 
233 Objections relations theory has long taught us that human beings have very strong 
desires for strong emotional attachments. “People are constructed in such a fashion that 
they are inevitably and powerfully drawn together . . . wired for intense and persistent 
involvements with one another.” STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN 
PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN INTEGRATION 21 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988). 
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marriage, it must have a very good reason. This is why marriage is a fundamental 
right. 
The legal rights and obligations that accompany marriage facilitate 
interdependence and commitment, but they do not define the social meaning of 
spouse. That social meaning comes from the social norms that accompany state-
sponsored marriage. Civil Unions or Domestic Partnership may not trigger the 
same set of norms and, thus, they may not demand of their participants the same 
kinds of commitments.234 The problem is not that separate or different cannot be 
equal, but that alternative marriage forms are likely to be materially different 
because of the different social norms that will accompany them. It is those social 
norms that make marriage a fundamental right because they are what give marriage 
its expressive and constitutive qualities. 
In order for same-sex couples to be entitled to that fundamental right, the 
social meaning of marriage must have more to do with being a spouse, than being a 
husband or wife. If marriage is about making two spouses, not making a husband 
and wife, same-sex and straight couples are similarly situated with regard to their 
ability to achieve that spousal status. Therefore, same-sex couples have an equality 
right to marriage. 
 
2.  Marriage and Children 
 
Marriage also often produces children. It can produce them by having one of 
the spouse’s get pregnant; it can produce them by adopting them; it can produce 
them by entering into some form of reproductive technology contract. My use of 
the impersonal pronoun here is deliberate. The law used to think of marriage itself 
as producing children. Custody jurisdiction at divorce extended to “children of the 
marriage.” 235 Courts in intestacy proceedings routinely referred to “children of the 
marriage.”236 Today, we tend to think of parents and spouses separately. 
Individuals produce children; marriages do not. But marriage retains more 
importance as an institution when the law gives it credit for producing children and 
same-sex parents have much to gain in giving that credit to marriage. 
The opponents of SSM are surely right in Stories #4 and #5 when they say 
that children have something to do with marriage. For many people, the desire for 
children probably motivates the decision to marry. And that makes sense. It may 
                                                 
234 Elizabeth Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 537 (2007) 
(questioning whether the social norms and expectations for marriage—commitment, 
fidelity, full emotional intimacy—will be retained for Civil Unions and Domestic 
Partnerships). 
235 For a list of states that define custody jurisdiction as pertaining to “children of the 
marriage,” see Bryce Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco 
Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution 
Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 336, n.149 (1996). 
236 See Cary v. Buxton, 1793 WL 256, 5 (Va. 1793) (“father[’]s intention to provide 
for all the children of the marriage . . . .”); Peyton v. Hallett, 1 Cai. R. 363, n.(a) (interests 
of “children of the marriage” not affected.). 
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be for children’s sake that we channel adults into the restrictive institution of 
marriage. 
Critics to the left of the SSM movement have mocked the use of children in 
the SSM litigation as a transparent attempt to make same-sex couples look 
“normal.”237 This same criticism of marriage dismisses it as inherently boring, 
sexually stifling, and autonomy-denying.238 Proponents of SSM may need to 
concede that marriage is all those things. But so is parenthood. For those who 
question why straight adults burden themselves with the restrictions of marriage, 
and why so many gay adults are expending so many resources so that they have the 
opportunity to burden themselves with the restrictions of marriage, it helps to 
remember children. The limited reliable data that we have on child-rearing 
suggests that children probably benefit from their parents’ boredom and lack of 
autonomy, from the cabined sexuality, and from the stability and interdependence 
that marks marriage.239 
Embracing the link between marriage and children is particularly important 
for many same-sex families. As discussed in Part III, traditionally, marriage 
determined parenthood, especially for fathers.240 Opponents of SSM are wrong 
when they suggest that traditional marriage ensures that children are raised by their 
biological parents. As Blackstone said, traditional marriage ensures that children 
have legal parents.241 Marriage was never able to make the biological link secure. 
Instead, the person married to the woman who gave birth was the father. 
The marital presumption has waned in importance as genetic science has 
made it increasingly easy to determine genetic parenthood. This has led to a wave 
of cases involving non-genetic parenthood. A divorcing woman can now reliably 
inform her soon-to-be-ex-husband that he is not the genetic father of “their” child, 
and then argue that he should be denied custody.242 Divorcing men find out they 
                                                 
237 See Franke, supra note 219, at 239-40 (noting “the deployment of children as 
props that attest to our normalcy . . .”). 
238 Id. (“It’s a tired argument by now that the problem with these staged spectacles [of 
gay couples looking ‘normal’] . . . is that they are boring, though of course they are.”); see 
also MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE, 87-95 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (discussing how supporting SSM ignores 
the best principles of Stonewall, which included, “diversity in sexual and intimate 
relations” and “resistance to state sanctioned legitimacy of consensual sex.”). 
239 See Gennetian, et al., supra note 70, at 417; Ginther & Pollack, supra note 70, at 
691; MCLANANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 70, at 134. 
240 See Baker, supra note 63, at 22-23 (“For most of western history, marriage, not 
blood, determined fatherhood. . . . A child born out of wedlock was fillius nullius, or child 
of nobody.”). 
241 See Blackstone, supra note 62, at 443 (“the main end and design of marriage [is] to 
ascertain [parenthood]”). 
242 See, e.g., Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) 
(mother estopped from denying husband’s paternity); In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 
N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ill. 1995) (biological mother estopped from denying husband’s 
paternity of the child when she represented to him that he was the father and, relying on 
that representation, he developed a relationship with the child.). 
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are not the genetic fathers and argue that they should not have to pay child 
support.243 Divorcing men find out they are not genetic fathers but still want 
parental rights.244  
These cases have bred new doctrines involving equitable parenthood, de facto 
parenthood, and much more expansive visitation options for non-legal parents,245 
but defining parenthood through marriage would render many of these doctrines 
unnecessary. Gay parents have benefited from these doctrines to a certain extent, 
but they would find much more protection in the traditional link between marriage 
and parenthood. If marriage defined parenthood, courts would not have to struggle 
nearly so much with these equitable and ill-defined doctrines.246 Courts would not 
need to look for parenting contracts or implicit intent to share parental rights 
between gay partners.247 More important, non-biological gay parents would have 
access to what non-biological straight parents have always been awarded—
custody, not just visitation.248 Custodial rights and child support responsibilities 
would be part of the rights and obligation of marriage because children are a part 
of the definition of marriage. 
A strong link between marriage and parenthood could also protect gay parents 
from the potential dangers involved in the increasingly strong call to make genetic 
parenthood more relevant. The United States is one of the few major industrialized 
countries that still allows anonymous gamete donation.249 Canada, the UK, and 
Sweden all require that children born through artificial insemination be given 
access to information that allows them to find their donor parents.250 This means 
                                                 
243 See, e.g., Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 76 (Md. 2000) (husband who found out 
he was not the biological father still responsible for child support if biological father cannot 
be found); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 777 (N.J. 1985) (husband who found out he 
was not the father of third child of the marriage still responsible for child support). 
244 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (husband 
could seek custody of child even though he had found out he was not the genetic father);  
In re Marriage of Roberts, 694 NE2d at 1346 (same).  
245 See Baker, supra note 63, at 31-35 (describing the variety of contexts in which 
courts have used equitable parent doctrines to provide visitation rights); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(b)-(c) (2002) (recommending the adoption of the terms 
equitable parent and de facto parent).  
246 There is often vigorous debate over the applicability of these doctrines.  See the 
dissents in Markov, 758 A.2d at 84 (citing the dissent in Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 552); 
MHB, 498 A.2d at 781, and Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d at 483.    
247 See E.N.O. v. L.M.M. 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Mass. 1999); see generally J.A.L. 
v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
248 Cf. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891, and J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1317 with the husband 
whose wife is estopped from denying biological fatherhood, thus allowing the husband to 
petition for custody, not just visitation. 
249 See Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 
GA. L. REV. 649, 688 (2008) (discussing the trend to identify gamete donors as an 
outgrowth of a belief in the importance of biological connection). 
250 Id. 
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that, in many gay families, there are clearly identifiable alternative parent 
figures.251 If a gay couple is divorcing, and perhaps even if they are not, that 
alternative parent figure may be able to secure some sort of parental rights. 
Allowing a sperm donor or surrogate mother to secure rights dissipates the rights 
of the gay parents. A strong link between marriage and parenthood diminishes the 
relative importance of genetics to parenthood and strengthens gay parental rights. 
 
3.  Summary 
 
Story #7 incorporates many of the previously offered stories of marriage. It 
explains why the state confers marital rights and obligations, why marriage has 
meaning beyond those rights and obligations, and why children should be relevant 
to discussions of marriage. What Story #7 rejects is Story #6. Marriage is not a 
forum for gender production. Marriage makes spouses, not husbands and wives. 
Becoming a spouse has social meaning that gives marriage its constitutive and 
expressive qualities, which, in turn, make marriage a fundamental right. Gay 
couples are just as able to become spouses as are straight couples. Gay couples do 
not have an equality right to degender the gender factory, but if marriage is not 
inherently gendered, then gay couples have an equality right to the institution. 
 
B.  Some Implications 
 
Social conservatives often assume that the SSM movement is the inevitable 
outgrowth of the loosening of marriage and gender norms that started with the 
divorce reform movement in the 1960s.252 Story #7 reflects liberalized gender 
norms—it rejects the role of marriage in producing gender at all—but it does not 
reflect the ideology of the divorce reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Indeed, as the following discussion suggests, the story of marriage offered here 
rejects much of what is considered the modern ideology of marriage. 
 
1.  Spousal Maintenance 
 
First, the divorce revolution’s theory of divorce involved both “end[ing], as 
far as possible, all personal and economic ties between the spouses” and 
emphasizing that “both spouses should become equal and independent social and 
economic actors after divorce and that neither spouse should be especially 
burdened by the divorce decree.”253 Because, in the 1960s and 1970s, women were 
                                                 
251 Id. at 714 (suggesting that the movement to identify genetic parents may lead to a 
more fluid understanding of parenthood, one in which the traditional two-parent model 
gives way to a model involving more parents. This new model would necessarily weaken 
the parental rights of the traditional parents). 
252 See WITHERSPOON, supra note 94, at 9 (“[I]n the last forty years, marriage and 
family have come under increasing pressure from the modern state, modern economy, and 
modern culture.”). 
253 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 80, at 389. 
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coming to be viewed as equally able to earn money, and because personal growth 
and individual autonomy came to be valued more highly than they once were,254 
the law’s willingness to bind two divorced people together dissipated. “Neither 
[spouse] should be shackled by the unnecessary burdens of an unhappy 
marriage.”255 The ideal of letting the couple go their separate ways was consistent 
with the emerging understanding of marriage as a relationship between 
autonomous equals, either of whom could choose to leave if he or she was 
unhappy. Virtually every state amended their spousal maintenance statutes to 
encourage more limited alimony awards as a way of minimizing long-term 
entanglement between ex-spouses. 
Few people today quarrel with the idea that marriage is a relationship between 
equals, and few more argue for a return to fault-based divorce.256 But, it did not 
take long for courts or commentators to realize that divorce reform’s vision of the 
parties being able to completely separate after divorce simply would not work. In 
marriages of significant duration or with differentiated roles, both members of the 
couple usually cease being autonomous. The primary wage earner depends on the 
non-wage earner for unpaid, familial labor—most of which usually benefits the 
parties’ children—and the primary caretaker depends on the primary wage earner 
for financial well-being. Those dependencies cannot be addressed adequately with 
a simple edict that directs the parties to go their separate ways. 
When men’s marital contributions are primarily monetary and women’s 
marital contributions are primarily nonmonetary, ending all personal and economic 
ties between the parties leaves ex-wives extraordinarily vulnerable. Even if a wife 
does make monetary contributions to the marriage, if they are less than her 
husband’s (which, as part IV shows, they usually are), encouraging the two parties 
to go their separate ways can leave a woman in economic circumstances far less 
desirable than those she enjoyed while married. Some judges realized this after the 
initial divorce reforms were adopted. They began rejecting limited-term 
maintenance because they recognized the hardship it imposed on women.257 Recent 
                                                 
254 See Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807-08 (1985) (describing how growing concern for 
individuals’ psychological happiness affected family law). 
255 Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) overruled 
by Petersen v. Petersen, 428 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1981). 
256 See generally Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, 
Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
719, passim (1997) (some states have re-introduced fault based divorce with the idea of 
covenant marriage, but the idea has not spread very far). See generally STEVEN L. NOCK ET 
AL., COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE MOVEMENT TO RECLAIM TRADITION IN AMERICA passim 
(2008). 
257 See Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 683 (Nev. 1988) (looking to standard of living, 
not contribution in awarding alimony to wife after a thirty-five-year marriage and awarding 
long-term maintenance); In re Marriage of LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (Wis. 
1987) (same for twenty-five-year marriage); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 595 N.E.2d 792, 
793-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (same for twenty-nine-year marriage). 
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reform work also acknowledges the failure of the divorce revolution in this regard, 
making clear that in marriages of sufficient duration or with significant role 
division, the clean break theory of divorce should not apply.258 
The movement away from a more individualistic view of marriage, and back 
toward a recognition that marriage creates lasting interdependencies can be seen by 
some as a step in the wrong direction. People eager to see women assume equally 
prominent roles in the public sphere resist this step backwards because awarding 
maintenance to women who opt out of competition in the public sphere may 
encourage them to opt out. People concerned about maximizing women’s presence 
in prominent and powerful public positions may think that marriage should not 
encourage traditional gender roles in any way. 
The story of marriage offered here encourages traditional gender roles 
because it acknowledges the efficiency and stability that can stem from marital 
roles. It rewards the spouse who assumes the traditionally female role. In doing so, 
it gives same-sex couples the right to marry, but at the cost of celebrating the roles 
that lead to such a glaring gender wage gap. It accepts marriage as a union of 
equals—it understands marital roles as rooted in marriage, not gender—but, it 
suggests that one of the main reasons for marriage is to allow for the creation of a 
separate but equal regime. 
In the long term, SSM may help reduce the correlation between gender roles 
and marital roles. If enough same-sex couples assume marital roles that are 
inconsistent with their socially defined gender roles, the gender roles themselves 
may be destabilized. This is the fear of opponents of SSM.259 If enough men 
become primary caretakers and enough women become primary wage earners, 
then the likelihood that straight couples will fall into traditional gender roles may 
dissipate. Marriage will still facilitate roles, just not sex-based gender roles. This 
will take time, however. In the interim, the acceptance of roles is likely to enable 
or encourage married women to continue to commit less time to the paid labor 
force and more time to unpaid work. 
 
2.  Premarital Agreements 
 
Second, the idealization of emotional interdependence in marriage 
undermines modern trends to rely more on contract doctrine in marriage. 
Acknowledging the emotional interdependence of marriage is critical to explaining 
why marriage should be viewed as a fundamental right because it is the emotional 
interdependence that gives marriage its expressive and constitutive qualities. But 
the emotional connection between the parties undermines the ability of traditional 
contract law to order affairs between them. Thus, Story #7 casts doubt on some 
courts’ willingness to enforce premarital agreements. 
                                                 
258 See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 245, at §§ 5.01-.14 
(suggesting that maintenance should be awarded based on the length of marriage and the 
degree to which the couple adopted marital roles). 
259 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
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Many states still require a finding of procedural fairness before enforcing 
premarital agreements, but most states have dispensed with any substantive review 
of premarital contract terms. 260 As long as there was a full disclosure of assets 
prior to execution, and as long as the parties had a chance to secure independent 
legal representation, courts will enforce the contracts.261 
If part of what we celebrate in marriage is its ability to alter the individuals 
who enter the institution, its ability to make two into one, it is not clear that we 
should honor a contract made between the two. It is not, as the traditional non-
enforcement policy presumed, that such an agreement is made in contemplation of 
divorce and therefore against public policy.262 Rather, it is that the self one is 
acting on behalf of when one signs a prenuptial agreement is supposed to be 
changed by marriage. If one acts to protect the premarital self, one is undermining 
the emotional transformation that marriage is supposed to enable and encourage. 
The purpose of marriage is to change its participants, to make them less 
autonomous, more duty-bound, and more defined by others. A premarital 
agreement protecting the premarital self enables one to avoid the emotional and 
material work of marriage. If one avoids that work, one should not be entitled to 
the respect and dignity that accompanies marriage. 
For some this may be too harsh a response to premarital agreements, many of 
which are entered into by older couples seeking to protect their offspring’s 
inheritance. These seemingly sensible and non-problematic estate planning devices 
protect for the decedent’s children the share of her estate that otherwise would go 
to her spouse at her death.263 Because the marriages involved in these agreements 
often do not last that long, perhaps the emotional transformation that marriage is 
supposed to produce need not bar the agreements’ enforcement. Or perhaps courts 
should be allowed to enforce the agreements, but review them carefully for 
substantive fairness. A very strong endorsement of the argument above suggests 
that marital contracts cannot be enforced at all. 
                                                 
260 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 80, at 728. 
261 Id. (There may be reason to doubt how willing courts really are to enforce any 
procedurally fair prenuptial agreement. Most of the people using these contracts have great 
wealth and much, though not half, of it ends up being shared. Even parties that are not 
wealthy usually draft the agreements understanding the background rules of maintenance 
and property division. Though lawyers may secure for the more advantaged party a better 
percentage of marital property or a lesser maintenance obligation, they virtually never draft 
agreements that relieve their clients of any substantial financial obligation at divorce. If 
lawyers thought that prenuptial agreements were enforced as readily as some commentators 
and courts have suggested, presumably many more people would push the envelope to 
explore how little actually had to be shared (though parties may be concerned about 
signaling stinginess and therefore resist pushing the envelope)).  
262 See Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1764 (2007) 
(premarital agreements thought to encourage divorce). 
263 See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marital Contracts and the Family Economy, 
93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 72 (1998). 
52 JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES [VOL. 12 
  
A more moderate (and realistic) endorsement of the argument above suggests 
that courts should simply return to a comprehensive substantive review of the 
agreements, to ensure that the contract reflects the background norms of marriage, 
including sharing and sacrifice. If the state licenses marriage because it wants to 
encourage sharing and sacrifice, it is not clear that people who want to avoid 
sharing and sacrifice should be able to marry. Some contracting, or baseline-
setting, could still be allowed, but the wealthier party would need to be prepared to 
show that the agreement was substantively fair.264 
 
3.  Less Autonomy 
 
At a more abstract level, the story of marriage offered here simply rejects an 
individualistic, more casual approach to marriage. Story #7 sounds more in the 
language of Griswold v. Connecticut, marriage is “intimate to the degree of being 
sacred . . . an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . an 
association for as noble a purpose as any,”265 than Eisenstadt v. Baird, “the marital 
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an 
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup.”266 Case law subsequent to Eisenstadt suggests that the right protected in 
that case, for single people to receive contraceptives, can be found in an 
individual’s liberty interest in reproductive decision-making.267 Thus, the marriage 
narrative offered here does not reject the holding of Eisenstadt, only its dicta 
suggesting that marriage is nothing more than an association of two individuals.268 
Nor does Story #7 suggest that we should return to the days of fault-based 
divorce because marriages must be permanent and harder to exit. The ideal of 
marriage presented here is just that, an ideal. What is celebrated in marriage is the 
potential to live into that changed life, to experience the difference of two 
becoming one. For sure, many married people will not experience that. They will 
divorce too early or they will live a married life marked by much more autonomy 
and independence than merger. The state cannot compel the emotional 
interdependence that is reified in marriage; it can only endorse and encourage it. 
By explicitly encouraging that emotional interdependence, Story #7 goes 
further than most other stories of marriage in explaining why polyandrous 
arrangements are not entitled to constitutional protection. The state courts granting 
same-sex couples the right to marry have been notably weak in their explanation of 
                                                 
264 This would permit wealthy individuals to continue to use pre-nuptial agreements 
as they often do now. Pre-nuptial agreements usually limit what an ex-spouse will receive 
but still afford them substantial amounts of wealth. 
265 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
266 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972). 
267 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-53 
(1992) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to . . . 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . . .”). 
268 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (finding the right to privacy violated by state 
restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives to non-married people). 
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why marriage need not be extended to multiple spouse arrangements. The 
Massachusetts Court dropped a footnote noting that no party had suggested that the 
rules barring polygamy would be implicated if the Court legalized SSM.269 
Presumably though, if the Court could find no rational reason for restricting 
marriage to a man and a woman despite the numerous studies suggesting that 
children tend to do best in a married household with both of their biological 
parents,270 it would want some evidence suggesting that the restriction on multi-
party marriage was necessary before dismissing a right to polyandrous marriage. 
Comparably, in a footnote and without evidence, the California Court 
dismissed any potential arguments about polyandry noting the “potentially 
detrimental effect on a sound family environment.”271 Why the Court thought that 
more than one spouse would have obviously detrimental effects on the family 
environment went completely undiscussed. For a Court that so adamantly declared 
the constitutionality of the right to marry, the Court’s willingness to summarily 
dismiss the right to a different kind of marriage—one that is probably the most 
widely practiced form of marriage in the world—is quite remarkable. 
The reason why polyandrous relationships should not command the same 
constitutional respect is because it is extraordinarily difficult for three or four, or 
five or six to become one. Relationships of more than two people are so much less 
likely to achieve the kind of transcendence and intimacy that is celebrated in 
marriage that the state should not endorse those relationships. It is the emotionally 
interdependent connection that creates the separate marital entity as a unity. It is 
that unity that serves the interests of both individuals and the state. 
There is plenty to criticize in this ideal of marriage. Many people reject it 
because they reject the idea of state-sponsored marriage. 272 Many people may 
believe that people would be better off if the state chose to treat everyone as an 
individual and nothing as a unity. Others probably reject Story #7 as too hopelessly 
rooted in a patriarchal past, one in which the “we” really represents nothing other 
than the “I” of the husband.273 Still others can dismiss this ideal as fanciful. If so 
                                                 
269 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969, n.34 (Mass. 2003).  
270 See Gennetian, supra note 70, at 419; Wax, supra note 68, at 388-90. 
271 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 434 n.52. (Cal. 2008). 
272 See Franke, supra note 219, at 239 (“the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay 
right movement has now become ‘the couple.’”); Moran, supra note 219, passim 
(celebrating the advantages of non-married life, particularly for women); Rosenbury, supra 
note 219, at 212 (criticizing the way the law privileges family relationships, particularly 
marriage, over friendships). 
273 Emma Goldman, Marriage and Love, in RED EMMA SPEAKS 158, 164-65 (Alix 
Kates Shulman ed., 1972) (“The institution of marriage makes a parasite of woman.”); 
Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. 
L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993) (the role division in marriage is “inherently problematic”); see 
also Lee Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1173-74 
(questioning idea of treating family as a unit, a “we,” because “the practical consequence . . 
. [is to] confer or ratify the power of one family member over others.”). 
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many marriages end in divorce, the ideal is so rarely realized, that it is pointless to 
reify it.274 
All of these criticisms may be valid, but all of them also leave one struggling 
to answer why marriage is a fundamental right or why gays and lesbians may have 
an equality right to the institution. If marriage does not serve expressive and 
constitutive functions, then why aren’t states free to deny it to prisoners275 and to 
men too poor to pay child support?276 If there is no legal ideal of marriage, why 
can’t four people get married? Alternatively, if the problem with Story #7 is that it 
is a fanciful ideal, not a real description of marriage, then supporters of SSM are 
left to argue that what they are fighting for is real marriage. But real marriage, as 
Part IV shows, is a gender factory. It is an institution that promotes stability and 
interdependence and self-fulfillment by enabling and reproducing gender roles. If 
that is what SSM advocates are fighting for, they cannot have an equality right to it 





The stories of marriage offered in this article do not constitute an exhaustive 
list. State-sponsored marriage may mean many other things to other people. But 
words and social institutions do have common meanings informed by common 
norms. Nobody thinks I have a right to marry my pet. Everybody understands what 
it means when a prisoner claims a right to get married. There is commonality in the 
midst of all the debate over SSM. 
The stories that get told about marriage affect that common understanding of 
marriage as do the practices of people who marry. At present, the practices of 
married people strongly support the gendered story of marriage. This story posits 
that what makes marriage so beneficial to its participants and to society is its 
ability to promote and reproduce gender. This story of marriage proves resilient in 
the face of both fundamental right and equality challenges because it suggests that 
same-sex couples are unlikely to achieve or enjoy the marital benefits that come 
from conforming to gender roles, and they are not similarly situated to straight 
couples with regard to their ability to reify those gender roles. Proponents of SSM 
need another story to tell about marriage. 
                                                 
274 The oft-quoted statistic that 50% of all marriages end in divorce is misleading. The 
most recent demographic data suggests that the divorce rate, as measured by number of 
marriages that actually end in divorce, has never been higher than 41%. See Dan Hurley, 
Divorce Rate: It’s Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at F7. Moreover, 
many of those are not first time marriages. The number of first time marriages that end in 
divorce is lower. Id. 
275 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (striking down prison regulation that 
barred male prisoners from marrying). 
276 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (finding the Wisconsin law 
unconstitutional that hinged the right to marry on paying child support).  
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Fundamental rights arguments require an articulation of why marriage is more 
than a bundle of legal rights and obligations, and how it can be that something 
more without incorporating gender norms. Equality arguments require an 
explanation of why same-sex couples should be entitled to marriage, not just civil 
unions. The seemingly cogent maxim offered by courts and commentators, that 
separate is not equal, reflects neither real world sensibilities with regard to gender 
nor the totality of the law of gender discrimination. Private biases with regard to 
gender roles play an important part in courts’ acceptance of gender difference and, 
in many contexts, courts accept separately gendered regimes. 
To make those private biases less salient in the context of marriage, SSM 
proponents must start telling a story of marriage as an institution that is ennobling 
and restricting, demanding and edifying, without being gendered. It must be a story 
that explains why the state should encourage both the emotional and material 
interdependence of marriage. The story offered here is one such story. It is a story 
that may make marriage unattractive to many, but a right for same-sex couples. 
